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SWEAT EQUITY: IN RE AHLERS
Patrick W. Fischer*
I. INTRODUCTION
Agribusiness, America's largest business, employs approximately 25
to 30 million people.1 Today that sector of the economy faces a bleak
financial future, and the family farmer is among those hardest hit.2 Ob-
servers consider the cause of this crisis to be a complex blend of circum-
stances, including the rises in interest rates3 and in the amount of debt
farmers carry,4 and the declines in commodity prices, in land prices,5 and
* B.A., 1979, College of St. Thomas; J.D., 1987, William Mitchell College of Law. The au-
thor is currently on Staff at Arkell Development Company in St. Paul, Minnesota, while pursuing an
L.L.M. in Taxation at William Mitchell Collge of Law. The author would like to thank Lynn
Andert and Rachel Riensche for their assistance in the preparation of this article.
1. MINNESOTA CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION, FARM CRISIS: 1985 8 (June, 1985) [here-
inafter FARM CRISIS].
2. It is estimated that there are approximately 650,000 full-time farmers, of which 40,000 have
debts equal to 70% of their assets. Church, Real Trouble on the Farms, TIME, Feb. 18, 1985, at 27-
28. Approximately 160,000 farmers have debt equal to or above 40% of their assets. Id. When the
debt to asset ratio reaches the 40% level, creditors usually consider the debtors to be high risk and
are not likely to do business with them. Id.
3. See FARM CRISIS, supra note 1, at 9.
4. Farm debt has risen from a low of $50 billion in the early 1970's to almost $200 billion
today. See Church, supra note 2, at 27. There are many reasons why this has occurred. In the
1970's, the world-wide demand for grain and fiber increased tremendously. Thus, the government
encouraged farmers to plant as many acres as possible. Farmers followed the government's advice
because the prices for these crops were so high. The farmers then borrowed money to bring more
acres into cultivation. Bankers went out and begged farmers to borrow money. As one senator
stated: "We had bankers going up and down the road like Fuller Brush salesmen .. " Id. The
farmers borrowed money based on the amount of assets they had, (which included inflated land
prices which would later fall dramatically), not by cash flow. WALL STREET JOURNAL REVIEW OF
OUTLOOK, 22 (Dec. 6, 1985). Interest rates also became very high in the early 1980's. They reached
a high of 21.5% in 1980. See Bland, Insolvencies in Farming and Agribusiness, 73 Ky. L.J. 795, 796
(1985). See generally Harl, The Architecture of Public Policy: The Crisis in Agriculture, 34 U. KAN.
L. REV. 425 (1986).
5. In 1981 there was a world-wide recession and a surplus of grain which slashed demand for
U.S. grain, subsequently causing commodity prices to fall. When farm prices fell, the land the crops
were grown on could no longer support the interest payments for the money borrowed on the land.
Thus, as land prices fell, so did the farmer's asset level. See Church, supra note 2, at 27. In Minne-
sota, the price of land dropped an average of 30% between 1981 and 1984. See FARM CRISIS, supra
note 1, at 8. Even with the land prices adjusted downward, there were many times when no one
would purchase the farms. Id.
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in exports.6 These factors have caused both a dramatic decrease in farm
revenues and a substantial increase in farm costs. As the number of in-
solvent farmers increases, so does the number of bankruptcy filings as
farmers attempt to reorganize.7 Some experts predict that if drastic steps
are not taken quickly, one-third of all American farmers will become
insolvent during the next three to four years. 8
Another consequence of the farm crisis is the changes that have oc-
curred in bankruptcy law. As the number of farm bankruptcy filings
increases each year, the number of situations requiring specially tailored
solutions also increases. When the major changes that occurred in the
Bankruptcy Code in 19789 are coupled with the multiplicity of unique
situations in farm businesses, the potential interpretation problems are
endless.
Many interpretation problems have occurred with regard to two sec-
tions of the Bankruptcy Act: § 362 Automatic Stays' 0 and § 1129 Reor-
ganization Plans. 1 Section 362 problems occur with regard to adequate
protection, (described in § 361)12 and whether a secured creditor can get
the automatic stay lifted in order to recover the collateral which secured
the loan.13 Problems under § 1129 occur most often when the bank-
ruptcy court confirms a reorganization plan which was proposed by the
6. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. Other reasons cited for the farm crisis are the
grain embargo, strengthening of the dollar, and increased competition from other countries. See
FARM CRIsIs, supra note 1, at 10.
7. See FARM CRIsIS, supra note 1, at 10.
8. See Harl, supra note 4, at 430.
9. The new bankruptcy statute became effective October 1, 1979. See infra notes 29-41 and
accompanying text for a complete discussion of how the bankruptcy law changed from pre-1978 to
post-1978.
10. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
11. Id. § 1129.
12. Id. § 361. As can be seen by the statute, adequate protection is not defined. Rather, the
three different ways adequate protection may be provided for are listed. See also Bankers Life Ins.
Co. v. Alyucan Interstate Corp. (In re Alyucan Interstate Corp.), 12 Bankr. 803 (Bankr. D. Utah
1981). This case provides a complete analysis of what constitutes adequate protection and how it is
applied.
13. Section 362(d) grants relief from an automatic stay by an injunction when:
(d) On request of a party in interest and after notice and a hearing, the court shall grant
relief from the stay provided under subsection (a) of this section, such as by terminating,
annulling, modifying, or conditioning such stay-(1) for cause, including the lack of adequate protection of an interest in property of
such party in interest; or(2) with respect to a stay of an act against property under subsection (a) of this
section if-
(A) the debtor does not have an equity in such property; and
(B) such property is not necessary to an effective reorganization.
11 U.S.C. § 362(d) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
Section 362(b) lists eleven exceptions which will automatically remove a debtor's stay:
(b) The filing of a petition under section 301, 302, or 303 of this title, or of an application
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debtor, but was rejected earlier by the creditors because they felt it was
unfeasible. t4
under section 5(a)(3) of the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970 (15 U.S.C.
78eee(a)(3)), does not operate as a stay-
(1) under subsection (a) of this section, of the commencement or continuation of a
criminal action or proceeding against the debtor;
(2) under subsection (a) of this section, of the collection of alimony, maintenance, or
support from property that is not property of the estate;
(3) under subsection (a) of this section, of any act to perfect an interest in property
to the extent that the trustee's rights and powers are subject to such perfection under
section 546(b) of this title or to the extent that such act is accomplished within the
period provided under section 547(e)(2)(A) of this title;
(4) under subsection (a)(1) of this section, of the commencement or continuation of
an action or proceeding by a governmental unit to enforce such governmental unit's
police or regulatory power;
(5) under subsection (a)(2) of this section, of the enforcement of a judgment, other
than a money judgment, obtained in an action or proceeding by a governmental unit
to enforce such governmental unit's police or regulatory power;
(6) under subsection (a) of this section, of the setoffby a commodity broker, forward
contract merchant, stockbroker financial institution,, (sic) or securities clearing
agency of any mutual debt and claim under or in connection with commodity con-
tracts, as defined in section 761(4) of this title, forward contracts, or securities con-
tracts, as defined in section 741(7) of this title, that constitutes the setoff of a claim
against the debtor for a margin payment, as defined in section 741(5) or 761(15) of this
title, or settlement payment, as defined in section 741(8) of this title, arising out of
commodity contracts, forward contracts, or securities contracts against cash, securi-
ties, or other property held by or due from such commodity broker, forward contract
merchant, stockbroker financial institution,, (sic) or securities clearing agency to mar-
gin, guarantee, secure, or settle commodity contracts, forward contracts, or securities
contracts;
(7) under subsection (a) of this section, of the setoff by a repo participant, of any
mutual debt and claim under or in connection with repurchase agreements that consti-
tutes the setoff of a claim against the debtor for a margin payment, as defined in
section 741(5) or 761(15) of this title, or settlement payment, as defined in section
741(8) of this title, arising out of repurchase agreements against cash, securities, or
other property held by or due from such repo participant to margin, guarantee, secure
or settle repurchase agreements;
(8) under subsection (a) of this section, of the commencement of any action by the
Secretary of Housing and Urban Development to foreclose a mortgage or deed of trust
in any case in which the mortgage or deed of trust held by the Secretary is insured or
was formerly insured under the National Housing Act and covers property, or combi-
nations of property, consisting of five or more living units;
(9) under subsection (a) of this section, of the issuance to the debtor by a govern-
mental unit of a notice of tax deficiency; or
(9) (sic) under subsection (a) of this section, of any act by a lessor to the debtor
under a lease of nonresidential real property that has terminated by the expiration of
the stated term of the lease before the commencement of or during a case under this
title to obtain possession of such property. (sic)
(10) (sic) under subsection (a) of this section, of the presentment of a negotiable
instrument and the giving of notice of and protesting dishonor of such an instrument.
11 U.S.C. § 362(b) (1982 & Supp. III 1985)(footnotes omitted). See also Comment, Automatic Stay
Under the 1978 Bankruptcy Code: An Equitable Roadblock to Secured Creditor Relief, 17 SAN Di-
EGO L. REV. 1113, 1124-26 (1980).
14. When the bankruptcy court confirms the reorganization plan over the undersecured credi-
tor's dissent, it is called a "cram-down." See generally Klee, All You Ever Wanted to Know About
Cram Down Under the New Bankruptcy Code, 53 AM. BANKR. L.J. 133, 134-36 (1979). Section 1129
governs this problem:
(b)(1) Notwithstanding section 510(a) of this title, if all of the applicable requirements of
1987]
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The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals was confronted with both of
these interpretation problems in the case of In re Ahlers. The Ahlers'
farm had debt that exceeded its assets by a substantial margin16 and the
farm had virtually no chance of financial survival without reorganization
under Chapter 11.
After the Ahlers fied for protection under Chapter 1117 and the
automatic stay commenced, the creditors began an action to have the
stay lifted by an injunction,"8 claiming that the Ahlers could not give
them the protection to which they were entitled. The Eighth Circuit
subsection (a) of this section other than paragraph (8) are met with respect to a plan, the
court, on request of the proponent of the plan, shall confirm the plan notwithstanding the
requirements of such paragraph if the plan does not discriminate unfairly, and is fair and
equitable, with respect to each class of claims or interests that is impaired under, and has
not accepted, the plan.
(2) For the purpose of this subsection, the condition that a plan be fair and equitable with
respect to a class includes the following requirements:
(A) With respect to a class of secured claims, the plan provides-
(i)(I) Only one that the holders of such claims retain the liens securing such
claims, whether the property subject to such liens is retained by the debtor or
transferred to another entity, to the extent of the allowed amount of such claims;
and
(II) Only one that each holder of a claim of such class receive on account of
such claim deferred cash payments totaling at least the allowed amount of such
claim, of a value, as of the effective date of the plan, of at least the value of such
holder's interest in the estate's interest in such property;
(ii) for the sale, subject to section 363(k) of this title, of any property that is
subject to the liens securing such claims, free and clear of such liens, with such
liens to attach to the proceeds of such sale, and the treatment of such liens on
proceeds under clause (i) or (iii) of this subparagraph; or
(iii) for the realization by such holders of the indubitable equivalent of such
claims,
(B) With respect to a class of unsecured claims-
(i) the plan provides that each holder of a claim of such class receive or retain
on account of such claim property of a value, as of the effective date of the plan,
equal to the allowed amount of such claim; or
(ii) the holder of any claim or interest that is junior to the claims of such class
will not receive or retain under the plan on account of such junior claim or inter-
est any property.
(C) With respect to a class of interests-
(i) the plan provides that each holder of an interest of such class receive or
retain on account of such interest property of a value, as of the effective date of
the plan, equal to the greatest of the allowed amount of any fixed liquidation
preference to which such holder is entitled, any fixed redemption price to which
such holder is entitled, or the value of such interest; or
(ii) the holder of any interest that is junior to the interests of such class will not
receive or retain under the plan on account of such junior interest any property.
11 U.S.C. § 1129(b) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
15. 794 F.2d 388 (8th Cir. 1986).
16. Id. at 408-14.
17. The Ahlers filed for protection under Chapter II of the Bankruptcy Code on November 30,
1984. This was 14 days after Norwest Bank of Worthington commenced a replevin action against
the Ahlers in state court for their equipment and machinery. Id. at 392-93.
18. The injunction to lift the stay was first granted by the Bankruptcy Court and later the
district court, but was reversed by a three member panel of the Eighth Circuit. Id. at 393-94.
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Court, however, determined that the Ahlers could provide adequate pro-
tection by making monthly payments. 19
The creditors also tried to stop the proposed reorganization plan
from being confirmed. Because the plan allowed the Ahlers to retain
ownership of the farm after the debts were paid by recognizing that they
were contributing knowledge, expertise, and management skills to the
plan, the creditors argued that the plan was not feasible or "fair and
equitable."2 Again, the court held for the Ahlers by finding that the
plan was both feasible and "fair and equitable," and that the creditors
would be adequately compensated.
The Ahlers decision is unique since it marked the first time a court
had considered a debtor's labor, expertise, and management skills in de-
termining whether the debtor should be allowed to participate in a reor-
ganization plan and retain an equity interest in the property.21
Previously, other courts recognized the absolute priority rule as allowing
a junior ownership interest to participate only if the debtor22 could con-
tribute cash to the reorganization plan.23
This comment takes an in-depth look at §§ 361, 362, and 1129 of
the Bankruptcy Code and examines how the Eighth Circuit has changed
the sections as a result of the Ahlers decision. First, it will analyze the
Eighth Circuit Court's reasoning for approving the delay of adequate
protection payments until the foreclosure proceedings are statutorily
complete, and why labor, knowledge, and expertise should allow a
farmer to own the farm when the reorganization plan is complete. The
comment will then discuss adequate protection and the two different the-
ories of what must be included in adequate protection payments. Fi-
nally, the absolute priority rule in the "cram down" provisions of § 1129
of the Code will be analyzed to determine whether this rule should be
strictly applied to dissenting undersecured creditors.
II. BACKGROUND
On November 6, 1978, President Carter signed into law H.R.
19. The court looked at numerous aspects of adequate protection, including when the creditor
receives possession of the property and how quickly he can dispose of it. Id. at 396-97.
20. The plan must satisfy the "fair and equitable requirement" even if the creditors do not
approve of the reorganization plan. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(1) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
21. See Ahlers, 794 F.2d at 401-03.
22. Id. at 401-02.
23. See, eg., Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Prod. Co., 308 U.S. 106, 121-22, reh'g denied, 308
U.S. 637 (1939); Sophian v. Congress Realty Co., 98 F.2d 499, 502 (8th Cir. 1938).
1987]
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8200,24 the fifth bankruptcy law25 promulgated under the congressional
power to create uniform laws. 26 The 1978 Code was enacted to modern-
ize a bankruptcy system designed "in the horse and buggy era of con-
sumer and commercial credit .. ."' The new Code was desperately
needed because of the vast changes that had occurred in the U.S. econ-
omy, including the new case law attributed to the adoption of the Uni-
form Commercial Code and the increased use of credit by Americans.28
The bill had taken more than ten years to develop and was the first com-
prehensive change in over forty years.29
Two basic goals are common to both the 1978 Act and the previous
bankruptcy laws: 1) to give the debtor a fresh start;30 and 2) to allow a
supervised collection and liquidation or reorganization of a debtor's
property. The Code provides three ways to liquidate or reorganize the
debtor's assets and liability to meet these goals: 1) Chapter 7 (liquida-
tion);3 2) Chapter 11 (reorganization); 32 and 3) Chapter 13 (adjustment
of debts of an individual with regular income).3 Most farmers file under
24. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549, reprinted in 1978 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 5787. The act took effect on October 1, 1979, and is also known as
the "Edwards Act" because Congressman Don Edwards was the floor manager of the bankruptcy
legislation in the House of Representatives. See Klee, Legislative History of the New Bankruptcy
Law, 28 DE PAUL L. REv. 941 & n.6 (1979).
25. The first bankruptcy act was enacted in 1800, 2 Stat. 19 (1800), but only lasted three years
before it was repealed. The next major piece of legislation was the Bankruptcy Act of 1841, 5 Stat.
440 (1841), which lasted until 1843 when it was repealed. The Bankruptcy Act of 1867, 14 Stat. 517
(1867), lasted the longest of the three acts, 11 years, until it too was repealed. The 1867 Act was the
first to allow relief for corporations. The Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (1898),
remained in effect until its repeal by the Bankruptcy Act of 1978. It was amended several times on a
piecemeal basis, with the most comprehensive changes occuring with the Chandler Act in 1938, 52
Stat. 840 (1938). See Klee, supra note 24, at 941 n.1. See generally C. WARREN, BANKRUPTCY IN
THE UNITED STATES HIsTORY (1935) (a complete history of the bankruptcy law in the 19th
century).
26. Congress is given power to establish uniform laws for bankruptcy under Article 1, § 8:
"The Congress shall have power... to establish a Uniform Rule of Naturalization and uniform Laws
on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States .... U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
27. H. R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEws 5963, 5965.
28. Public policy on how bankruptcies should be handled was also changing. See Klein, The
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 53 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1 (1979).
29. The Bankruptcy Act of 1978 originated in 1968 when Senator Quentin Burdick chaired
hearings to determine whether a commission to review the bankruptcy laws was needed. See Klee,
supra note 24, at 942 & n. 14.
30. See Lines v. Frederick, 400 U.S. 18, 19 (1970). See also Donnelly, The New (Proposed?)
Bankruptcy Act: The Development of Its Structural Provisions and Their Impact on the Interests of
Consumer Debtors, 18 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 291, 317-20 (1978) (discussing the impact on public
interest and the "traditional American concern for human dignity"). See also S. REP. No. 989, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 6, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 5787, 5792.
31. 11 U.S.C. § 701-66 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
32. Id. §§ 1101-1174.
33. Id. §§ 1301-1330.
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Chapter 11 because it does not require a trustee to be appointed34 and
because farmers cannot qualify under Chapter 13.
31
The Bankruptcy Code gives farmers special protection due to the
uncertain and unique nature of their business. 36 Thus, the threshhold
issue becomes fitting into the Code's definition of a farmer.37 Once cate-
gorized as a farmer, three special provisions help the farmer who is filing
for bankruptcy.3" First, a farmer cannot be forced into bankruptcy by a
creditor; the farmer determines when to file. This allows the farmer an
opportunity to plan and strategize.39 Second, creditors cannot force a
farmer to go from a Chapter 11 reorganization to a Chapter 7 liquida-
tion. A farmer may do so voluntarily, but cannot be forced." Finally,
certain property is exempt under both the Federal Bankruptcy Code and
state statutes.41
A. Automatic Stay
A fundamental protection for debtors is the automatic stay provided
for in section 36242 of the Bankruptcy Code. This provision has been
34. See Bland, supra note 4, at 813-14. The debtor will "act in the shoes of the trustee .. " Id.
at 813. He has all the powers, rights, and performs all the duties and functions of a trustee. Id. A
trustee for the farm estate will only be appointed if cause is shown. See 11 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (1982).
35. The requirements for a chapter 13 filing are as follows: "1) an individual (not a corporation
or partnership) with 2) regular income and 3) unsecured debts totaling less than $100,000 and se-
cured debts amounting to less than $350,000." See Bland, supra note 4, at 810. Most farmers do not
qualify because they are leveraged to a much higher level than the Chapter 13 requirements allow.
Id.
36. Congress noted the cyclical nature of farming and that "[o]ne drought year or one year of
low prices, as a result of which a farmer is temporarily unable to pay his creditors, should not subject
him to involuntary bankruptcy." H.R. RaP. No. 595, supra note 27, at 322, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEvs at 6278; see also In re Beechwood, 42 F. Supp. 401, 403 (N.J. 1942) ("The excep-
tional benefits provided for farmers under the Bankruptcy Act were designed for the protection of
those who in good faith seek their livelihood from the soil.").
37. In bankruptcy law, a farmer is a person "who receives more than 80% of his gross income
during a taxable year from a farming operation which he owns or operates." Bland, supra note 4, at
801 (citations omitted); see also Evans v. Florida Nat'l Bank, 38 F.2d 627 (5th Cir. 1930).
38. See Bland, supra note 4, at 802.
39. Id.
40. See Besler v. Northwest Prod. Credit Ass'n (In re Besler), 19 Bankr. 879, 884 (Bankr. D.
S.D. 1982) ("A farmer-debtor cannot be converted from a Chapter 11 to an involuntary Chapter
7 .... ). See also 11 U.S.C. §§ 303(a), 112(c) (1982).
41. See Bland, supra note 4, at 802-03.
42. Section 362 reads in pertinent part:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a petition filed under section 301,
302, or 303 of this title, or an application filed under section 5(a)(3) of the Securities Inves-
tor Protection Act of 1970 (15 U.S.C. 78eee(a)(3)), operates as a stay, applicable to all
entities, of-
(1) the commencement or continuation, including the issuance or employment of
process, of a judicial, administrative, or other action or proceeding against the debtor
that was or could have been commenced before the commencement of the case under
7
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part of the Code since 1933 and is one of the most useful tools for a
debtor's reorganization or liquidation.43 Commentators have called it
the cornerstone of the Bankruptcy Code."
The intended effect of the automatic stay is to preserve the status
quo of the parties as of the date of commencement of the bankruptcy
proceeding." As such, the stay has two purposes. First, it provides the
debtor with a breathing spell from creditors.46 By allowing this break, it
prevents creditors from taking any action against the debtor which
would further disorganize a debtor's efforts to deal with its financial
problems.47 It helps frightened, inexperienced, or ill-counseled debtors
who might succumb to creditors' attempts to make the debtors pay in-
stead of utilizing the bankruptcy laws.48 It also gives the debtor time to
analyze the situation and formulate plans for either the repayment of the
debts in a reorganization or the liquidation of the business.4 9 Second, it
provides a systematic and equitable process for all creditors."0 The stay
this title, or to recover a claim against the debtor that arose before the commencement
of the case under this title;
(2) the enforcement, against the debtor or against property of the estate, of a judg-
ment obtained before the commencement of the case under this title;
(3) any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or of property from the
estate or to exercise control over property of the estate;
(4) any act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien against property of the estate;
(5) any act to create, perfect, or enforce against property of the debtor any lien to the
extent that such lien secures a claim that arose before the commencement of the case
under this title;
(6) any act to collect, assess, or recover a claim against the debtor that arose before
the commencement of the case under this title;
(7) the setoff of any debt owing to the debtor that arose before the commencement of
the case under this title against any claim against the debtor; and
(8) the commencement or continuation of a proceeding before the United States Tax
Court concerning the debtor.
I1 U.S.C. § 362 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). For a complete discussion of automatic stays see Ken-
nedy, Automatic Stays Under the New Bankruptcy Law, 1980 ANN. SURV. OF BANKR. LAW, 23
(1980).
43. See Comment, supra note 13, at 1117. "The first 'automatic stay' was enacted in 1933 as
section 75(o) of the first relief for farmers legislation." Id. (footnote omitted).
44. See Sesslin, Section 362-The Automatic Stay, 1986 ANN. SURV. OF BANKR. LAW, 373
(1986).
45. See United States v. Sayres, 43 Bankr. 437, 439 (W.D. N.Y. 1984); In re H & W Enters.,
Inc., 19 Bankr. 582, 587 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1982).
46. See, eg., John Deere Co. v. Kozak Farms, Inc. (In re Kozak Farms, Inc.), 47 Bankr. 399,
402 (W.D. Mo. 1985); In re Lee, 35 Bankr. 452, 456 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1983) (the stay is concerned
primarily with temporary protection of the debtor).
47. See In re Haffner, 25 Bankr. 882, 887 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1982). See also Kozak Farms, 47
Bankr. at 402.
48. In re Holland, 21 Bankr. 681, 688 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1982); see also H.R. REP. No. 595,
supra note 27, at 342, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 6298-99.
49. In re Frigitemp Corp., 8 Bankr. 284, 288-89 (S.D. N.Y. 1981).
50. See, eg., Holtkamp v. Littlefield (In re Holtkamp), 669 F.2d 505, 508 (7th Cir. 1982) ("The
purpose of the automatic stay is to preserve what remains of the debtor's insolvent estate and to
8
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will keep one creditor from pursuing a remedy against the debtor to the
disadvantage of other creditors with claims against the same debtor."
By refusing to allow a single creditor to take any portion of the debtor's
estate, the Code allows the estate to stay in one piece. 2
Although it is difficult to lift an automatic stay once it is put into
effect,53 the Code does allow relief in certain instances. Under subsection
(d) of § 362"4 the court, on request of a party in interest, may grant relief
from the stay by terminating, anulling, modifying, or conditioning an
automatic stay for cause. 5 Typically, cause is shown in one of two
ways.5 6 The first occurs when inadequate protection of an interest in
property can be established.5 7 This aspect is one of the most often liti-
gated areas of the Code. The second way, also with respect to property,
provides a stay will be lifted if two requirements are met: 1) the debtor
does not have any equity in the property; and 2) the property is not nec-
provide a systematic equitable liquidation procedure for all creditors secured as well as unsecured.");
In re White Motor Credit Corp., 37 Bankr. 631, 637 (N.D. Ohio) affirmed, 761 F.2d 270 (6th Cir.
1984); Central Trust Co. v. Mr. D. Realty Co. (In re Mr. D. Realty Co.), 27 Bankr. 359, 364 (Bankr.
S.D. Ohio 1983) (creditors concerned over the protection of the status quo); see also H.R. REP. No.
595, supra note 27, at 340, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 6296-97; S. REP. No. 989,
supra note 30, at 54-55, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 584041.
51. See Triangle Management Serv. v. Allstate Say. & Loan Ass'n, 21 Bankr. 699, 700 (N.D.
Calif. 1982).
52. Donovan v. LaPorta (In re LaPorta), 26 Bankr. 687, 690 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1982).
53. There are eleven exceptions that will prevent an automatic stay from going into effect:
(1) criminal actions or proceedings against the debtor; (2) collection of alimony, maintenance, and
support from non-estate property; (3) any act to perfect an interest in property to a limited extent;
(4) governmental actions to enforce policy or regulatory powers; (5) enforcement of non-money
judgments obtained in governmental, police, or regulatory proceedings; (6) set-offs involving mutual
debts and claims in certain securities; (7) set-offs by a repo participant; (8) foreclosure of certain
properties by the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development; (9) issuances of notices of tax
deficiency; (10) acts by lessors; and (11) presentments of negotiable instruments. 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)
(1982 & Supp. III 1985).
54. On request of a party in interest and after notice and a hearing, the court shall grant
relief from the stay provided under subsection (a) of this section, such as by terminating,
annulling, modifying, or conditioning such stay-
(1) for cause, including the lack of adequate protection of an interest in property of
such party in interest; or
(2) with respect to a stay of an act against property, under subsection (a) of this sec-
tion, if-
(A) the debtor does not have an equity in such property; and
(B) such property is not necessary to an effective reorganization.
Id. § 362(d).
55. See H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 27, at 344, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws at
6300.
56. For other grounds under which cause can be shown, see 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY,
362.07[d][1] (15th ed. 1985) (hereinafter "COLLIER").
57. See I1 U.S.C. § 362(d)(l) (Supp. III 1985); see also 11 U.S.C. § 361 (1982 & Supp. III
1985). See generally 2 COLLIER, supra note 56, t 362.07[d][1].
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essary for an effective reorganization. 8
B. Adequate Protection
Section 361 of the Bankruptcy Code describes the adequate protec-
tion of a creditor's interest in a debtor's estate. 9 The purpose of ade-
quate protection is to "assure the maintenance, and the recoverability of
the lien value in the interim period between the filing of the petition and
the acceptance of a plan of reorganization."6 Since a debtor could con-
tinually use the creditor's collateral during a Chapter 11 proceeding, its
value could be depreciated or consumed in its entirety.61 The section was
primarily designed to relieve a secured creditor's fear of losses.
The Code does not define what constitutes adequate protection or
when it should be calculated. The Code also does not specify the method
and timing of valuation of the collateral.62 Section 361 does, however,
provide a non-exclusive list63 of three types of adequate protection:
1) periodic or lump sum cash payments;' 2) an additional or replace-
ment lien;65 or 3) any other type of relief which will result in a realization
58. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(2)(A) & (B) (1982). See generally 2 COLLIER, supra note 56,
362.07[d][1].
59. When adequate protection is required under section 362, 363, or 364 of this title of an
interest of an entity in property, such adequate protection may be provided by-
(1) requiring the trustee to make a cash payment or periodic cash payments to such
entity, to the extent that the stay under section 362 of this title, use, sale, or lease
under section 363 of this title, or any grant of a lien under section 364 of this title
results in a decrease in the value of such entity's interest in such property;
(2) providing to such entity an additional or replacement lien to the extent that such
stay, use, sale, lease or grant results in a decrease in the value of such entity's interest
in such property; or
(3) granting such other relief, other than entitling such entity to compensation al-
lowable under section 503(b)(1) of this title as an administrative expense, as will result
in the realization by such entity of the indubitable equivalent of such entity's interest
in such property.
11 U.S.C. § 361 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
60. Aegean Fare, Inc. v. Commonwealth (In re Aegean Fare, Inc.), 34 Bankr. 965, 969 (Bankr.
D. Mass. 1983).
61. See, eg., Fruehauf Corp. v. Yale Exp. Sys., Inc. (In re Yale Exp. Sys., Inc.), 384 F.2d 990
(2nd Cir. 1967).
62. Adequate protection was not defined in the Code due to the extensive debates that took
place over the methods and timing of valuation. Each case is so unique that Congress finally just
decided to let the courts make the ultimate decision. See General Elec. Mtg. Corp. v. South Village,
Inc. (In re South Village, Inc.), 25 Bankr. 987, 995 (Bankr. D. Utah 1982), for a complete discussion
of this debate and the consequences of the decision of Congress.
63. See In re Cooper, 22 Bankr. 718, 720 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1982); In re Aurora Cord & Cable
Co., Inc., 2 Bankr. 342, 346-47 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1980).
64. 11 U.S.C. § 361(1) (Supp. III 1985). Section 361 derived the notion from In re Bermec
Corp., 445 F.2d 367 (2d Cir. 1971), that periodic cash payments to the creditor should be made "to
the extent that the stay or the grant of a lien results in a depreciation of the value of the collateral."
Klein, supra note 28, at 20. See also In re Kertennis, 40 Bankr. 895 (Bankr. D. R.I. 1984).
65. 11 U.S.C. § 361(2) (1982). See, eg., In re Serbus, 48 Bankr. 5 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1984) (lien
10
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of an "indubitable equivalent" of the creditor's interest.66 Because each
bankruptcy case is unique and equitable factors must be considered,67
Congress left this determination to the courts. Also, by not defining ade-
quate protection, the debtor is allowed greater flexibility in determining a
method of protection.68 A secured party seeking payments cannot call
upon the courts to devise a scheme to provide adequate protection.69 Be-
cause Congress did not intend to put the courts in an administrative role,
the device to supply adequate protection must be proposed by the debtor
or the trustee.7 °
The courts are split between three different methods to determine
what constitutes adequate protection and which interests are to be pro-
tected.71 The first theory, the opportunity cost theory, considers the con-
sequences of the automatic stay. By delaying the creditor's opportunity
to repossess the collateral, sell it, and reinvest the proceeds from the sale,
the creditor loses the interest the money would have generated if it had
been available for reinvestment. 72 Under this theory, adequate protec-
tion should be allowed for the foregone opportunity to make additional
money.
The second theory, the maintenance of value theory, is the majority
view.73 Under that approach, adequate protection is found only if the
on future crops is not acceptable); In re Berg, 42 Bankr. 335 (Bankr. D. N.D. 1984) (a first lien on
crops); In re Magnus, 50 Bankr. 241 (Bankr. D. N.D. 1985) (a lien on depreciable equipment).
66. 11 U.S.C. § 361(3) (1982). See In re Martin, 761 F.2d 472, 477-78 (8th Cir. 1985).
67. See, eg., Alibon Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Langley (In re Langley), 30 Bankr. 595, 605 (Bankr.
N.D. Ind. 1983); Cooper, 22 Bankr. at 720; see also H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 27, at 339, 1978
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws at 6295:
This section does not specify how value is to be determined nor does it specify when it is to
be determined. These matters are left to case-by-case interpretation and development. It is
expected that the courts will apply the concept in light of the facts of each case and general
equitable principles.
Id.
68. See Comment, Adequate Protection of the Undersecured Creditor During the Automatic Stay
in Chapter 11 Cases: Compensation for Opportunity Cost or Maintenance of the Value of the Collat-
eral?, 5 J. oF L. & COM. 259, 259-60 (1985).
69. See American Security Bank v. Robson (In re Robson), 10 Bankr. 362, 365 (Bankr. N.D.
Ala. 1981); In re Saint Peter's School, 16 Bankr. 404, 410 (Bankr. S.D. N.Y. 1982).
70. See H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 27, at 338, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws at
6295.
71. See Comment, Adequate Protection of Time Value for Undersecured Creditors During the
Automatic Stay in Bankruptcy: Where are We After American Mariner?, 2 BANKR. DEV. J. 341, 344
(1985).
72. Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. Anchorage Boat Sales, Inc. (In re Anchorage Boat Sales, Inc.), 4
Bankr. 635, 643 (Bankr. E.D. N.Y. 1980).
73. See, e.g., Imperial Bank v. El Patio, Ltd. (In re El Patio), 6 Bankr. 518, 523 (Bankr. C.D.
Cal. 1980); Fort worth Mtg. Corp. v. Cantrup (In re Cantrup), 32 Bankr. 1004, 1005 (Bankr. D.
Colo. 1983); Aegean Fare, Inc. v. Commonwealth (In re Aegean Fare, Inc.), 34 Bankr. 965, 968
(Bankr. D. Mass. 1983); Barclays Bank v. Saypol (In re Saypol), 31 Bankr. 796, 800 (Bankr. S.D.
1987]
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value of the collateral is maintained. If the collateral is depreciating or is
being consumed, then adequate protection should be provided by the
debtor.74
The third theory has only been used by the Eighth Circuit.75 This
method allows the bankruptcy courts to decide between the two theories
described above on a case-by-case basis. This approach adopts a more
equitable analysis which acknowledges that each case has unique factors
that must be carefully considered.76
1. Opportunity Cost Theory
In re American Mariner Industries, Inc. 77 presented the latest and
most comprehensive discussion of the argument for the opportunity cost
theory. The court analyzed at length why an unsecured creditor should
be given compensation when his right to regain the secured collateral has
been delayed.
Two main arguments were set forth in American Mariner.78 The
first considered the statutory language of § 361 and the legislative history
behind it.79 In reading that section of the Act, the court focused on the
language "an interest of an entity in property... to the extent that the
stay... results in a decrease in the value of such entity's interest in such
property."80 Finding, as other courts have, that this language is ambigu-
N.Y. 1983); First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Shriver (In re Shriver), 33 Bankr. 176, 182-83 (Bankr.
N.D. Ohio 1983); General Elec. Mtg. Corp. v. South Village, Inc. (In re South Village, Inc.), 25
Bankr. 987, 994 (Bankr. D. Utah 1982); In re Pine Lake Village Apt. Co., 19 Bankr. 819, 825
(Bankr. S.D. N.Y. 1982); Bankers Life Ins. Co. v. Alyucan Interstate Corp. (In re Alyucan Inter-
state Corp.), 12 Bankr. 803 (Bankr. D. Utah 1981).
74. See, eg., Alibon Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Langley (In re Langley), 30 Bankr. 595, 604 (Bankr.
N.D. Ind. 1983); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Monroe Park (In re Monroe Park), 17 Bankr. 934 (D.
Del. 1982); United Virginia Bank v. Virginia Foundry Co. (In re Virginia Foundry Co.), 9 Bankr.
493 (W.D. Va. 1981); see generally O'Toole, Adequate Protection and Postpetition Interest in Chapter
11 Proceedings, 56 AM. BANKR. L.J. 251 (1982) (giving a historical perspective of post-petition
interest).
75. See In re Briggs Transp. Co., 780 F.2d 1339 (8th Cir. 1985). This is the main case that has
advocated this position.
76. Id. at 1349.
77. Crocker Nat'l Bank v. American Mariner Indus., Inc. (In re American Mariner Indus.,
Inc.), 734 F.2d 426 (9th Cir. 1984). In 1978, Crocker National Bank made a loan to American
Mariner Industries which was secured by a perfected interest in basically all of its assets. American
Mariner filed for reorganization at which time Crocker was owed approximately $370,000, with
collateral securing the loan worth only $110,000. Id. at 427.
78. Id. at 429-34.
79. See 11 U.S.C. § 361(1)(2) (1982 & Supp. III 1985); see also, Fortgang & Mayer, Valuation
in Bankruptcy, 32 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1061, 1070-72 (1985).
80. American Mariner, 734 F.2d at 430 (emphasis added). The court started its analysis by
recognizing that the language of a statute controls and then applied the plain meaning rule to the
statute. It further looked at the legislative history for persuasive language to support its conclusion.
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ous, the court then looked at the legislative history to determine the in-
tent of Congress.81 Since the House Report stated that the creditor
should be allowed the "benefit of his bargain" and receive "in value es-
sentially what he bargained for," 2 the court concluded the term "value"
meant that the creditor should receive the present value of his investment
at the point he could have otherwise repossessed the collateral absent the
automatic stay.83 Value is to be measured in the contractual sense and
not as a tangible asset.84 A creditor making a loan assumes that if the
debtor defaults on the loan, the collateral will be returned and the credi-
tor's losses reduced by disposing the collateral. If the law did not permit
a creditor to get the collateral back, the creditor then loses the opportu-
nity to dispose of the collateral, reinvest the money, and make a profit.
Allowing the creditor to receive adequate protection, (i.e. interest for the
time value of the money lost because of the automatic stay) means the
creditor receives the value of the transaction as initially bargained. 5
The second argument set forth by American Mariner was based
upon the historical and present nature of adequate protection and on the
phrase "indubitable equivalent" found in § 361(3).16 Judge Hand's opin-
Id. at 430-32. For an analysis of the plain meaning rule see Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 265-66
(1981).
81. See American Mariner, 734 F.2d at 430-32.
82. The House report states:
Secured creditors should not be deprived of the benefit of their bargain. There may be situa-
tions in bankruptcy where giving a secured creditor an absolute right to his bargain may be
impossible or seriously detrimental to the bankruptcy laws. Thus, this section recognizes
the availability of alternate means of protecting a secured creditor's interest. Though the
creditor might not receive his bargain in kind, the purpose of the section is to insure that
the secured creditor receives in value essentially what he bargained for.
H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 27, at 339 (emphasis added), 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS at 6295; see also S. RP. No. 989, supra note 30, at 49, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWs at 5835. Courts have continually looked at this language and have interpreted either for or
against the opportunity cost theory. See In re Pine Lake Village Apt. Co., 19 Bankr. 819, 827
(Bankr. S.D. N.Y. 1982) for Judge Schwartzberg's opinion of this section:
A mortgage transaction is a voluntary undertaking; the lender participates with the under-
standing that the mortgage contract creates a relationship that extends over a number of
years.... Adequate protection relates to preservation of the collateral value, and not to
compensation for the loss of a better business opportunity. As long as the collateral value
is constant, the mortgagee will receive the benefit of his bargain.
Id.
83. The court found that "[v]alue is another term intended to have broad scope in the context
of providing adequate protection to secured creditors." American Mariner, 734 F.2d at 431.
84. Id. at 430-31. See General Elec. Mfg. Corp. v. South Village, Inc. (In re South Village,
Inc.), 25 Bankr. 987, 992 (Bankr. D. Utah 1982).
85. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Monroe Park (In re Monroe Park), 17 Bankr. 934, 940-41
(D. Del. 1982) (by not allowing the foreclosure on the property, the lender was losing interest of
approximately $36,000 per month). See also United Virginia Bank v. Virgina Foundry Co. (In re
Virginia Foundry Co.), 9 Bankr. 493, 497-98 (W.D. Va. 1981).
86. American Mariner, 734 F.2d at 432-34.
1987]
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ion in In re Murel Holding Corp., 7 is considered the origin of adequate
protection. It looked at two aspects of adequate protection: 1) the
amount given as adequate protection must be completely compensatory;
and 2) the principal amount of the loan must be paid in full."8 The
American Mariner court interpreted the "indubitable equivalent" lan-
guage to mean that both interest and collateral must be paid. This analy-
sis originated in the legislative history of the "cram-down" provision, a
section which also contains the same phrase.8 9 Since the record stated
that the "indubitable equivalent" language was intended to follow the
strict approach taken by Judge Learned Hand in In re Murel Holding
Corp.,9 the court concluded that Congress knew what it meant when it
included the phrase "indubitable equivalent" in § 361: creditors should
be paid interest if a delay occurs because of bankruptcy proceedings. 91
2. Maintenance of Value Theory
The arguments for the maintenance of value theory are largely based
on alternate interpretations of key aspects of the opportunity cost theory.
The leading case is In re South Village, Inc.,92 in which Judge Mabey
87. 75 F.2d 941 (2d Cir. 1935). In this case, Metropolitan Life Insurance Company held an
apartment house mortgage on which the debtors defaulted. Foreclosure was stopped by a bank-
ruptcy filing while a reorganization plan was worked out. The plan called for an extension of time
for payments to be made along with other conditions. Judge Hand held that the creditor was not
adequately protected and that the extension should not be granted. Id. at 942-43.
88. In construing so vague a grant, we are to remember not only the underlying purposes
of the section, but the constitutional limitations to which it must conform. It is plain that
"adequate protection" must be completely compensatory; and that payment ten years hence
is not generally the equivalent of payment now. Interest is indeed the common measure of
the difference, but a creditor who fears the safety of his principal will scarcely be content
with that; he wishes to get his money or at least the property. We see no reason to suppose
that the statute was intended to deprive him of that in the interest of junior holders, unless
by a substitute of the most indubitable equivalence.
Murel, 75 F.2d at 942 (emphasis added).
89. See supra note 14 for the complete text of § 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii). American Mariner found
that:
In its final form, however, 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(i)(II) clearly requires deferred cash
payments under a reorganization plan to equal the present value of the allowed claim. The
"indubitable equivalent" requirement appears in section 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii) as an alternative
to deferred payments and carries with it, from its original context in Murel, the require-
ment of compensation for present value.
American Mariner, 734 F.2d at 433. The legislative record indicates that the cram-down provision is
based upon a present value analysis. See H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 27, at 414-15, 1978 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws at 6370-71.
90. See S. REP. No. 989, supra note 30, at 127, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWs at
5913.
91. American Mariner, 734 F.2d at 435.
92. 25 Bankr. 987 (Bankr. D. Utah 1982). South Village, Inc. is the owner of a shopping mall
on which General Electric Mortgage Corporation (GEMC) has a lien. After a filing for bankruptcy
occurred, GEMC tried to get the stay lifted because it was an undersecured creditor. The debt was
$4,369,000 and the value of the mall was $4,340,000. GEMC asked that it be paid for the present
[Vol. 23:37
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discussed the definition of "value" and "interest in property." 93 The pro-
ponents of this theory consider value as a tangible asset and not as a cash
equivalent, 94 and have found support for their approach in the legislative
history. When revising the Code, the Bankruptcy Commission described
adequate protection as protection from "a decrease in the value of the
asset not as a monetary unit."95 The House Report cited numerous ex-
amples such as: "the decrease in value of the... property involved," 96
and "a means of realizing the value of the original property, if it should
decline during the case."'9 7 Because of these statements, the South Vil-
lage court concluded that "value" and "interest in property" meant only
a decrease in existing collateral.98
The legislative history of § 361 also gives substantial support to the
"maintenance of value theory." First, the concept of adequate protection
is a codification of the rule from In re Bermec,99 a case of "economic
depreciation" and protection of the status quo, not of opportunity
costs."°° Second, when discussing subsection (1) of § 361, the Senate and
House Reports state that "the use of periodic payments may be appropri-
ate where, for example, the property in question is depreciating at a rela-
tivelyfixed rate. The periodic payments would be to compensate for the
depreciation.... "101 The legislative history also shows that during the
value of money that it was losing by not being able to sell the mall and reinvest the proceeds. The
court held against this request, reasoning that only the maintenance of the value of the property
should be allowed. Id. at 988-96. Another case that is heavily relied upon is Bankers Life Ins. Co. v.
Alyucan Interstate Corp. (In re Alyucan Interstate Corp.), 12 Bankr. 803 (Bankr. D. Utah 1981),
which was also written by Judge Mabey.
93. Judge Mabey recognized that the interpretation of these phrases is the key to determining
the protection required.
If the interest in property is determined according to the worth of tangible assets, such as
the "allowed secured claim," then the decrease in value may be any depreciation of this
claim. But if the interest in property embraces not only tangible assets but also intangible
rights, such as the right to foreclose, liquidate, and reinvest, then the decrease in value may
include opportunity cost.
General Elec. Mfg. Corp. v. South Village, Inc. (In re South Village, Inc.), 25 Bankr. 987, 989
(Bankr. D. Utah 1982) (footnote omitted).
94. See id. at 992.
95. "The Commission proposal described 'adequate protection,' not as protection of the value
of money, but as protection 'to the extent of the anticipated decrease in the value of the collateral as
a result of use.'" South Village, 25 Bankr. at 992 (quoting Report of the Commission on the Bank-
ruptcy Laws of the United States, H. Doc. No. 93-137, pt. II, at 237 (1973)).
96. H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 30, at 339, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at
6296.
97. Id. at 339-40, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 6296.
98. South Village, 25 Bankr. at 994-95.
99. 445 F.2d 367 (2d Cir. 1971).
100. See Comment, supra note 71, at 349-50.
101. H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 27, at 339, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at
6296; S. REP. No. 989, supra note 30, at 54, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 5840
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hearings on the Code, Congress was aware of the opportunity cost theory
but did not act to make any changes to § 361 to protect undersecured
creditors10 2 in a way that was consistent with that approach.
A recent Fifth Circuit case, In re Timbers of Inwood Forest Associ-
ates, Ltd., also held that interest should not be allowed on debts accru-
ing during a bankruptcy proceeding. The court did an in-depth analysis
of both the legislative and case law history of § 361 and § 362, °" then
refuted American Mariner's reasoning by looking at many of the same
factors that the court did in South Village. One problem recognized by
the court was that of determining how and when interest should be
charged on the debts of the debtor. 105 The court reasoned that because
the Code provides no guidance, determining when interest would begin
and what interest rate should be applied becomes very subjective and
therefore should not be allowed. There was also concern that if interest
payments were allowed, an adverse impact on the orderly distribution of
the debtor's assets would result. 0 6 Payment of interest would also result
in the premature distribution of unencumbered assets of the estate to the
undersecured creditors. This would unfairly take assets away from possi-
ble distributions to the unsecured creditors. 107
3. Eighth Circuit Approach
The Eighth Circuit has taken a position that is a compilation of the
opportunity cost theory and the maintenance of value theory. In the case
of In re Briggs Transportation Co.,108 the Eighth Circuit held that the
Bankruptcy Code does not give an undersecured creditor, as a matter of
law, the right to interest payments from the debtor because of the lost
opportunity costs that have accrued due to a bankruptcy filing.10 9 The
(emphasis added). The key is to determine the meaning of depreciation. The Supreme Court defined
it in Lindheimer v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 292 U.S. 151, 167 (1934) as "loss [of value], not restored by
current maintenance, which is due to all the factors causing the ultimate retirement of property.
These factors embrace wear and tear, delay, inadequacy, and obsolescence." Id., quoted in Com-
ment, supra note 68, at 268.
102. See South Village, 25 Bankr. at 1000.
103. United Say. Ass'n v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs. (In re Timbers of Inwood Forest
Assocs.), 793 F.2d 1380 (5th Cir. 1986).
104. Id. at 1393-1401.
105. Id. at 1402-03.
106. Id. at 1382.
107. Id.
108. 780 F.2d 1339 (8th Cir. 1985). See also Anderson, Adequate Protection of Opportunity Cost
After In re Briggs, 19 CREIGHTON L. REV. 765 (1986).
109. Briggs, 780 F.2d at 1340. The trial court mandated that undersecured creditors were enti-
tled to interest payments as a matter of law. The court based its decision on American Mariner
which had been decided shortly after the bankruptcy court had given its decision. Id. at 1341.
[Vol. 23:37
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court stated that the opportunity cost theory should be utilized on a case-
by-case basis, thus allowing greater flexibility in determining whether to
allow interest payments for lost opportunity costs.110
The court gave no specific rules as to how each case should be ana-
lyzed, but instead gave a list of non-exclusive factors that should be con-
sidered as guidelines when determining the applicability of granting
opportunity costs. Those factors include "the nature of the collateral
and the proposed use of the collateral in the interim," ' "the quality of
the collateral or the length of the stay," "whether the collateral's lien
value is demonstrated to be appreciating, depreciating or remaining rela-
tively stable," "whether taxes or other payments designed to keep the
collateral free of statutory liens are being paid,"1 1 2 and whether the
chances of a successful reorganization are great or slight.1 3 By using
this set of factors and any others that may be relevant, the courts are able
to reconstruct the bargain between the creditor and debtor and thus equi-
tably determine what interests must be protected during the automatic
stay. 114
While it is admirable that the court attempted to fashion an equita-
ble solution to this problem, the result is that courts facing these situa-
tions have little or no guidance on how to decide these cases. 1 Given
the uncertainty of this approach, both debtors and creditors are hard
pressed to predict what will occur in situations involving undersecured
collateral. 116
C. Reorganization Plan
When Congress revised the Bankruptcy Code in 1978, the former
Chapters 10, 11, and 12 were consolidated into a single unit, Chapter
11,117 which was designed to govern all business reorganizations. The
110. Flexibility was legislated into the Bankruptcy Code by the very fact that the term
"adequate protection" resists precise definition. This reflects congressional recognition
that myriad factors are taken into account by the parties in entering into a security agree-
ment and a wide spectrum of circumstances may exist at the time a debtor files a petition.
Id. at 1348-49 (footnote omitted).
111. Id. at 1349.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. See Anderson, supra note 109, at 774.
115. See Briggs, 780 F.2d at 1351. This is the position that Judge Gibson took in his dissent.
Judge Gibson felt this could allow the bankruptcy courts too much latitude in determining whether
or not to allow lost opportunity cost payments. Id.
116. Id. at 1352.
117. One of the most significant characteristics of the revamped Chapter 11 is its speed and
flexibility. This can be seen in the increased number of cases that were being filed under old Chapter
1987]
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reason for the change was two-fold: to eliminate a primary source of
litigation in large reorganization cases,"' and to clarify which chapter
governs the reorganization of public or private corporations.' 1 9
One basic assumption of the Code is that it is preferable to reorgan-
ize a business rather than allow it to be liquidated. 20 Both creditors and
debtors attempt to structure a plan that is fair to all parties involved.
Once a debtor has structured a plan (with or without the creditor's ap-
proval), it is confirmed in one of two ways: 1) the acceptance method, in
which the twelve requirements enumerated in the Code are met and the
creditors confirm the plan; 121 or 2) the cram-down method, 122 used when
a creditor or a group of creditors refuse to confirm a plan and, under
§ 1129(b), the plan is confirmed over the creditor's objection, thus al-
lowing the business to continue. The plan must be fair and equitable 123
11 and Chapter 12. See B. WEINTRAUB & A. RESNICK, BANKRUPTCY LAW MANUAL, 8.03, 8-8
(1980) [hereinafter "MANUAL"]. Also, by consolidating these chapters, the bankruptcy courts were
given greater leeway in dealing with troubled businesses. Id. The bankruptcy commission took the
best provisions of these chapters and consolidated them into Chapter 11. Chapter 11:
integrate[d] aspects of both "the best interests of creditors" rule of Chapter XI and the
"absolute priority rule" of Chapter X. When every member of a class of creditors or equity
holders does not agree to a plan, the plan must be in the "best interests" of [that class]....
If a class of creditors or interest holders does not accept the plan by a vote of a minimum
percentage of its members, the plan may still be imposed or "crammed down" on that class
as long as the absolute priority requirement is met as to the nonassenting class.
Id. at 8.03, 8-8 - 8-9 (footnotes omitted).
118. See 5 COLLIER, supra note 56, 1100.01[2].
119. See id. 1100.01, n.22; see also MANUAL, supra note 117, 8.05.
120. [I]t is often preferable to encourage and facilitate rehabilitation of businesses in finan-
cial trouble instead ofproviding for liquidation only. From a broad perspective, rehabilita-
tion is better for the economy because it minimizes unemployment and waste of business
assets. It is much more productive to use assets in the industry for which they were
designed instead of selling them as distressed merchandise at liquidation sales. Also, reha-
bilitating a business is in the best long-term interest of creditors and shareholders.
MANUAL, supra note 117, 8.01 (footnote omitted). See also Charlestown Say. Bank v. Martin (In
re Colonial Realty Investment Co.), 516 F.2d 154, 158 (1st Cir. 1975); Bass v. Dick (In re Dick), 296
F.2d 912, 914 (7th Cir. 1961); see generally, Blair, Classification of Unsecured Claims in Chapter 11
Reorganization, 58 AM. BANKR. L.J. 197 (1984).
121. The first eleven requirements are set forth in § 1129(a) and the twelfth is found in
§ 1129(d). Subsection (d) states in part:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, on request of a party in interest that is
a governmental unit, the court may not confirm a plan if the principal purpose of the plan
is the avoidance of taxes or the avoidance of the application of section 5 of the Securities
Act of 1933 (15 U.S.C. 77e).
11 U.S.C. § 1129 (d) (Supp. III 1985).
122. See supra note 14 for the complete text of Bankruptcy Code § 1129 which governs this area.
See also Klee, supra note 14, at 134.
123. The Code is fairly explicit in specifying whether a plan is fair and equitable with re-
spect to a dissenting class. The statute states that the requirement that a plan is fair and
equitable "includes" several factors. However, the legislative history makes clear that
some factors which are "fundamental" to fair and equitable treatment of a dissenting class
were omitted from the statute to "avoid complexity." For example, a requirement con-
tained in an earlier version of the Code would have assured a dissenting class that no senior
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and cannot discriminate unfairly lza against each class of claims that has
not accepted the plan. Only claims of the dissenting class and the classes
junior to the dissenting classes are affected.
Subdivision (b)(2) of § 1129 divides the dissenting class of creditors
into three categories: secured claim holders,125  unsecured claim hold-
class receives more than 100% of its claims, i.e., that it is not provided for more than in
full. While the deletion of this standard may be beneficial to understanding the statutory
language, it is not clear that the result "avoids complexity."
Klee, supra note 14, at 142 (footnotes omitted); see also Blum, The "Fair and Equitable" Standard
for Confirming Reorganizations Under the New Bankruptcy Code, 54 AM. BANKR. L.J. 165 (1980).
124. The meaning of "unfair discrimination" is unclear in the Code. However, the Report of the
House Judiciary Committee discussed unfair discrimination:
The plan may be confirmed under clause (iv) [§ 1129(b)(2)(B)(iv)] in those circumstances if
the class is not unfairly discriminated against with respect to equal classes and if junior
classes will receive nothing under the plan.... One aspect of this test that is not obvious is
that whether one class is senior, equal, or junior to another class is relative and not abso-
lute. Thus from the perspective of trade creditors holding unsecured claims, claims of
senior and subordinated debentures may be entitled to share on an equal basis with the
trade claims. However, from the perspective of the senior unsecured debt, the
subordinated debentures are junior.
This point illustrates the lack of precision in the first criterion which demands that a
class not be unfairly discriminated against with respect to equal classes. From the perspec-
tive of unsecured trade claims, there is no unfair discrimination as long as the total consid-
eration given all other classes of equal rank does not exceed the amount that would result
from an exact aliquot distribution. Thus if trade creditors, senior debt, and subordinate
debt are each owed $100 and the plan proposes to pay the trade debt $15, the senior debt
$30, and the junior debt $0, the plan would not unfairly discriminate against the trade debt
nor would any other allocation of consideration under the plan between the senior and
junior debt be unfair as to the trade debt as long as the aggregate consideration is less than
$30. The senior debt could take $25 and give up $5 to the junior debt and the trade debt
would have no cause to complain because as far as it is concerned the junior debt is an
equal class.
However, in this latter case the senior debt would have been unfairly discriminated
against because the trade debt was being unfairly overcompensated.... Application of the
test from the perspective of senior debt is best illustrated by the plan that proposes to pay
trade debt $15, senior debt $25, and junior debt $0. Here the senior debt is being unfairly
discriminated against with respect to the equal trade debt even though the trade debt re-
ceives less than the senior debt. The discrimination arises from the fact that the senior debt
is entitled to the rights of the junior debt which in this example entitle the senior debt to
share on a 2:1 basis with the trade debt.
The criterion of unfair discrimination is not derived from the fair and equitable rule or
from the best interests of creditors test. Rather it preserves just treatment of a dissenting
class from the class's own perspective.
H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 27, at 416-17, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 6372-73,
quoted in Blair, supra note 120, at 206-07. The article also points out that an objective standard
will be used to interpret the "unfair discrimination" test.
An interpretation of unfair discrimination as described in the preceding discussion provides
an objective standard of protection for dissenting classes of unsecured creditors and equity
holders. Without an objective standard, the courts would be required to provide a subjec-
tive one, presumably under the good faith requirement, to assure fair treatment of dissent-
ing classes where other equally-ranked classes accept the plan. The considerable detail of
section 1129 suggests that Congress intended the confirmation requirements to rely princi-
pally on objective standards.
Id. at 210 (footnotes omitted).
125. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
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ers, 126 and holders of an ownership interest. 127 Under each of the three
categories, the statute lists what is considered "fair and equitable;" it
does not define unfair discrimination.12 If the debtor requests that the
court confirm the plan over the creditor's objections, the court is re-
quired to do so if the interests of the dissenting creditors are protected
according to the statutory requirement set out for each category.
1 29
Section 1129(b)(2)(B) requires the debtor to meet one of two re-
quirements of the "fair and equitable" standard. 3 ' The claim must pro-
vide each holder of a claim to receive or retain property that has a
present value equal to the amount of the unsecured claim. 3 ' In the al-
ternative, a junior claim will not receive or retain any interest in the
debtor's property, although the unsecured claims must be accounted for
in full before any junior interest can be considered. 32 This section is
quite different from secured claims because it does not require the claim
to be paid in cash, but rather in property or other items of value equal to
its claim.
Classifying a creditor as possessing either an unsecured claim, a se-
cured claim, or an ownership interest is an application of a slightly modi-
fied version of the absolute priority rule. 33 In Northern Pacific Railway
126. Id. § 1129(b)(2)(B).
127. Id. § 1129(b)(2)(C).
128. See Klee, supra note 14, at 141.
129. See Id. at 142.
130. See 5 COLLIER, supra note 56, % 112 9.03[4][a].
131. See Fortgang & Mayer, supra note 79, at 1063. This article gives a good discussion of this
requirement and the present value concept.
132. See 5 COLLIER, supra note 56, 1129.03[l]. "[A] senior class will not be able to give up
value to a junior class over the dissent of an intervening class unless the intervening class receives the
full amount, as opposed to value, of its claims or interests." Id.
Alternatively, under clause (ii), the court must confirm the plan if the plan provides that
holders of any claims or interests junior to the interests of the dissenting class of impaired
unsecured claims will not receive any property under the plan on account of such junior
claims or interests. As long as senior creditors have not been paid more than in full, and
classes of equal claims are being treated so that the dissenting class of impaired unsecured
claims is not being discriminated against unfairly, the plan may be confirmed if the im-
paired class of unsecured claims receives less than 100 cents on the dollar (or nothing at
all) as long as no class junior to the dissenting class receives anything at all. Such an
impaired dissenting class may not prevent confirmation of a plan by objection merely be-
cause a senior class has elected to give up value to a junior class that is higher in priority
than the impaired dissenting class of unsecured claims as long as the above safeguards are
met.
Id. 11129.03[4][e], quoting 124 Cong. Rec. H.11,105 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978); S17,421 (daily ed.
Oct. 6, 1978).
133. See In re Ahlers, 794 F.2d 388, 401 (8th Cir. 1986). The difference is that the relaxed
standard permits senior classes to give value to junior classes so long as no dissenting intervening
class receives less than the full amount of its claims. Klee, supra note 14, at 143, n.80. For a
complete history of how the absolute priority rule developed through equity receivership see 6 COL-
LIER ON BANKRUPTCY at 28-33 (14th ed. 1940).
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Co. v. Boyd,134 the Court first said that if a class of creditors dissent, their
claims must be provided for in full before a junior class can receive an
equity interest or retain or receive any property. 135 The Supreme Court
later amended the absolute priority rule to allow a junior class to partici-
pate in a plan and receive an equity interest even if the unsecured credi-
tors were not paid in full, provided that the junior class "contributed
money or money's worth." '136 In Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Products
Co., 137 the court allowed the shareholders of a corporation to contribute
money to the business organization and receive an interest in proportion
to their contribution.13 In order for a plan to be successful, it requires
additional money that may only be available if the debtor is allowed to
contribute additional capital.13 9 The Supreme Court explained that cap-
134. 228 U.S. 482 (1913). This is one of the most famous cases in corporate reorganization law.
The case involved financing on a thirty-three mile section of track. Boyd was an unsecured creditor
of a discontinued company. The plan of the reorganization provided that the old shareholders
would participate if they infused some cash into the new company. It made no provisions for any of
the unsecured creditors. There had been a transfer of assets from the old company to the new
company and the creditors of the old corporation couldn't reach the new assets. Id. at 487. The
Supreme Court held that this was a fraudulent conveyance and it allowed Boyd to pursue remedies
against the assets of the new company. Id. 507-10. See generally 3 NORTON, BANKRUPTCY LAW &
PRACTICE § 63.21 (Callaghan). The principle set out in Boyd was not new. It was startling only
because for a number of years it had been ignored. Id. at 502.
135. For a complete analysis and historical perspective on the rule, see generally Blum &
Kaplan, The Absolute Priority Doctrine in Corporate Reorganizations, 41 U. CHI. L. REv. 651 (1974).
136. See Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Products Co., 308 U.S. 106, 122, reh'g denied, 308 U.S.
637 (1939).
137. Id. Other cases have developed this concept. See Consolidated Rock Prods. Co. v. Du
Bois, 312 U.S. 510 (1941); Group of Inst'l Investors v. Chicago Milwaukee St. P. & Pac. R.R. 318
U.S. 523 (1943). See generally Blum, Full Priority and Full Compensation in Corporate Reorganiza-
tions: A Reappraisal, 25 U. CHI. L. REv. 417 (1958).
138. The Los Angeles Lumber case stated that:
[T]his Court stress[es] the necessity, at times, of seeking new money "essential to the suc-
cess of the undertaking" from the old stockholders. Where that necessity exists and the old
stockholders make a fresh contribution and receive in return a participation reasonably
equivalent to their contribution, no objection can be made.
Los Angeles Lumber, 308 U.S. at 121 (footnote omitted).
139. See id. at 121, citing Kansas City Terminal Ry. Co. v. Central Union Trust Co., 271 U.S.
445 (1926) which stated that:
Generally, additional funds will be essential to the success of the undertaking, and it may
be impossible to obtain them unless stockholders are permitted to contribute and retain an
interest sufficiently valuable to move them. In such or similar cases the chancellor may
exercise an informed discretion concerning the practical adjustment of the several rights.
Id. Los Angeles Lumber also stated:
It is, of course, clear that there are circumstances under which stockholders may partici-
pate in a plan of reorganization of an insolvent debtor. This Court, as we have seen, indi-
cated as much in Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. Boyd, supra, and Kansas City Terminal Ry.
Co. v. Central Union Trust Co., supra. Especially in the latter case did this Court stress the
necessity, at times, of seeking new money "essential to the success of the undertaking"
from the old stockholders. Where that necessity exists and the old stockholders make a
fresh contribution and receive in return a participation reasonably equivalent to their con-
tribution, no objection can be made.
Los Angeles Lumber, 308 U.S. at 121.
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ital contributions by the debtor are appropriate since there is usually a
shortage of money in a reorganization. Since Los Angeles Lumber was
decided, other courts have only allowed equity interest when the debtor's
contribution has been in the form of money.14°
III. AHLERS DECISION
A. Factual Background
James and Mary Ahlers own 560 acres of the approximately 840
acres of land they farm near Worthington, Minnesota. 141 Two major
creditors hold most of the debt on the Ahlers farm.'42 Federal Land
Bank (FLB) has the largest claim against the Ahlers with approximately
$524,000 outstanding secured by first mortgages on four parcels of
land. 143 Norwest Bank of Worthington (Norwest) has outstanding loans
of approximately $450,000 secured by a second mortgage on the farm-
land, second liens on crops, livestock, other farm proceeds, and a first
lien on machinery.'"
The Ahlers' financial condition declined significantly in the early
1980's145 due to many of the same forces that plagued all family farmers.
The value of both their land and machinery declined significantly' 46 from
140. See, eg., In re U.S. Truck Co., Inc., 47 Bankr. 932, 941-43 (E.D. Mich. 1985); In re Landau
Boat Co., 13 Bankr. 788, 791-93 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1981); Buffalo Say. Bank v. Marston Enters. (In
re Marston Enters.), 13 Bankr. 514, 518 (Bankr. E.D. N.Y. 1981) (allowing cash to be contributed
for an equity position by the old stockholders). See also In re Potter Material Servs., Inc., 781 F.2d
99 (7th Cir. 1986).
141. In re Ahlers, 794 F.2d 388, 392 (8th Cir. 1986).
142. There are three other creditors to whom the Ahlers also owed money: John Deere Credit
Corporation ($35,791), secured by a combine; Commodity Credit Corporation ($3,337), secured by a
grain bin; and General Motors ($2,900), secured by an automobile. Id.
143. The mortgages were taken out between December, 1965 and January 1982. Id. at 392. The
principal balances on the parcels of land as of November 30, 1984 were:
Parcels Principal Balance
Parcel A (240 acres) $335,403.00
Parcel B (160 acres) 152,168.00
Parcel C (80 acres) 31,500.00
Parcel D (80 acres) 6,783.00
$524,854.00
Id. FLB's security interests are not cross-collateralized. Id.
144. These loans had been entered into between May, 1982 and April, 1984. Id. All of
Norwest's security interests are cross-collateralized. Id.
145. Id.
146. The court noted the dramatic decline in land prices:
According to the highly respected publication of the University of Minnesota, Dion and
Raup, The Minnesota Rural Real Estate Market in 1985, Minnesota Agricultural Econom-
ics, No. 650, Jan. 1986, average land values in southwest Minnesota increased from $844
per acre in 1975 to $2,083 per acre in 1981. They fell to $1,401 per acre in 1984, and to
$967 per acre in 1985.
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the time the loans were obtained. Further, the price of crops declined
and bad weather reduced yields. The Ahlers were unable to make inter-
est payments on the loans to the secured creditors and this, along with
the decrease in the value of their assets, caused the loans to become
undersecured 
1 47
On November 16, 1984, Norwest began a replevin action against the
Ahlers to gain possession of their machinery and equipment.1 48 Four-
teen days later, on November 30, 1984, the Ahlers filed a petition for
reorganization under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. 49 By filing
for reorganization, an automatic stay was imposed and the replevin ac-
tion was halted. Subsequently, both Norwest and FLB filed for relief
from the stay, and after a hearing, the bankruptcy court granted their
motion to lift the stay.150 The court concluded that the Ahlers could not
make the adequate protection payments and therefore were not entitled
to the protection of an automatic stay.
15 1
Many related motions and orders were subsequently filed and de-
cided by the bankruptcy court.1 52 The automatic stay remained ineffec-
tive. The Ahlers then appealed to the United States District Court of
Minnesota to reinstate the stay and to allow the reorganization plan to be
Id. at 392, n.l.
147. Id. at 392.
148. The action was in state court pursuant to MINN. STAT. ANN. § 565.23 (West Cum. Supp.
1985). Ahlers, 794 F.2d at 392-93.
149. Ahlers, 794 F.2d at 393. The Ahlers retained possession of their assets and continued to
operate their farm as debtors in possession pursuant to §§ 1107 & 1108 of the Bankruptcy Code.
Appellants' Brief on Appeal at 1, In re Ahlers, 794 F.2d 388 (8th Cir. 1986).
150. The bankruptcy court held the hearing for both creditors' motions on February 27, 1985
and ordered the stay lifted on March 15, 1985. Ahlers, 794 F.2d at 393. The court found that the
Ahlers had debts totaling $1,042,301 and assets of only $696,499. See Bankruptcy Court Decision
on March 15 at 2.
151. The bankruptcy court determined that in order for the stay not to be lifted, the Ahlers
would have to provide the adequate protection payments. After hearing conflicting testimony over
the market value of the four parcels of land, the court found that the Ahlers would need to make
monthly payments of $3,800. Bankruptcy Court Decision on March 15 at 6. The Ahlers' only offer
of adequate protection to FLB was an offer to apply for a government program which guaranteed
80% of the FLB debt. However, the court decided that was not a good faith offer of adequate
protection. See Appellants' Brief on Appeal at 8. The Ahlers conceeded that they could not make
the payments and thus the court lifted the stay for FLB's claim. The court also lifted the stay for
Norwest because the Ahlers could not pay the monthly adequate protection payments. Appellants'
Brief on Appeal at 9. The district court's determination of the amounts due for adequate protection
were based upon Crocker Nat'l Bank v. American Mariner Indus., Inc. (In re American Mariner
Indus., Inc.), 734 F.2d 426 (9th Cir. 1984), and Land Lease v. Briggs Transp. Co. (In re Briggs), 35
Bankr. 210 (D. Minn. 1984) which utilized a lost opportunity cost analysis. Petition for Rehearing
and Suggestion for Rehearing en Bane at 3.
152. The main motion that was made by the two parties was to allow the bankruptcy court to
handle Norvest's replevin action and remove it from state court. Ahlers, 794 F.2d at 393.
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approved.53 The court did not reinstate the stay and instead found the
proposed reorganization plan to be "utterly unfeasible."' t 4 The Ahlers
appealed the decision to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals which, on
July 2, 1986, reversed and remanded it back to the district court.'
On appeal, three primary issues faced the Eighth Circuit. The first
was whether the automatic stay should have been lifted since adequate
protection payments could not be made by the Ahlers.l' 6 The second
issue was whether the reorganization plan by the Ahlers was feasible.' 57
The third issue concerned the absolute priority rule with regard to reor-
ganization plans. 15 8 With respect to this last issue, the court considered
whether to allow a junior ownership interest to participate in a reorgani-
zation plan with no contribution of capital when a class of dissenting
senior creditors would receive less than the full value of their claims.' 5 9
B. Adequate Protection
The court's analysis of the Ahlers case began by determining
whether the Ahlers' situation demanded that adequate protection pay-
ments be made. Once it decided that payments must be made, the court
determined three dates: 1) when adequate protection payments must be-
gin; 2) the date of the valuation of collateral for adequate protection pur-
poses; and 3) the timing of adequate protection payments.' 60 In setting
these dates, the court used § 362(d)' 6 ' of the Bankruptcy Code which
identifies when an automatic stay can be lifted because of inadequate pro-
tection of a creditor's interest.
The Eighth Circuit Court, agreeing with the Bankruptcy Court, de-
cided that adequate protection payments were needed162 and should con-
153. Id.
154. Petition for Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing en Banc at 4.
155. Ahlers, 794 F.2d at 403.
156. Id. at 393. The court had to determine when and how adequate protection should be calcu-
lated, and when the payments should start in the unique situation of farming. Id. at 395-97.
157. Norwest and FLB contended that even if their interests in Ahlers' assets were adequately
protected during the automatic stay, the Ahlers' reorganization plan was not feasible. Id. at 397.
158. Id. at 399.
159. Id. at 401-03.
160. Id. at 394-97. The court also had to decide-a minor issue of whether unencumbered grow-
ing crops could constitute adequate protection. Id. at 397. The bankruptcy court said they could
not but the Eighth Circuit decided differently in In re Martin, 761 F.2d 472 (8th Cir. 1985) and
therefore the Eighth Circuit Court allowed the crops to be used as collateral. Id.
161. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d) (1982 & Supp. III 1985). See supra note 13 for the complete text of the
statute.
162. The court stated that a bankruptcy court, in determining what constitutes adequate protec-
tion, must:
determine the date when the creditor, absent the filing of a bankruptcy petition, could have
[Vol. 23:37
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sist of interest payments for lost opportunity costs that occurred because
of the bankruptcy filing.1 63 The court was reluctant to agree with the
Bankruptcy Court's conclusion and did so only because of its previous
holding in the case of In re Briggs,1 which allowed bankruptcy courts
the flexibility to make this determination. By considering interest as a
form of protection, the creditor receives the benefit of the bargain16 and
is placed in a position similar to the one it would have been in if bank-
ruptcy had not been filed. 1
66
The Ahlers court, however, disagreed with the bankruptcy court as
to when the payments should begin. 67 The Ahlers court stated that ade-
quate protection payments would not be allowed until the time at which
the creditor would be allowed to retrieve and sell the collateral as deter-
mined by the state foreclosure law. If protection payments were made
prior to that time, the creditor would receive an unbargained for bene-
fit.1 68  Two exceptions exist to that rule. First, if the foreclosure is
taken possession of the collateral under state law and could have sold it to a third party,
the amount that the creditor would have realized at this sale, and the creditor's expected
return upon reinvestment.
Ahlers, 794 F.2d at 395.
163. The bankruptcy court based its conclusion on the premise that "due to the automatic stay,
the Federal Land Bank and Norwest were unable to immediately foreclose, liquidate the collateral,
and reinvest the liquidation proceeds." Id. The bankruptcy court made this decision based upon
Crocker Nat'l Bank v. American Indus., Inc. (In re American Mariner Indus., Inc.), 734 F.2d 426
(9th Cir. 1984). Id.
164. 780 F.2d 1339 (8th Cir. 1985). See supra notes 108-116 and accompanying text for an
analysis of this case.
165. The debtor should not be allowed to stop or delay a debtor's right to retrieve the collateral,
sell it, and reinvest the proceeds, by filing for bankruptcy. Ahlers, 794 F.2d at 395. This would
unduly burden the creditor and not allow him to receive the benefit of his bargain. Id.
The concept of providing a secured creditor with adequate protection in the form of inter-
est on the value of the collateral is premised on the theory that a secured creditor bargains
for the right to take possession of the collateral and sell it in the event that the debtor
defaults.
Id.
166. Id. at 395. The legislative history behind adequate protection confirms this position. The
House Report on § 361 states: "[t~hough the creditor might not receive his bargain in kind, the
purpose of the section is to insure that the secured creditor receives in value essentially what he
bargained for." H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 27, at 339, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at
6295.
167. The bankruptcy court held:
that the Federal Land Bank was entitled to monthly adequate protection interest payments
as of January 1, 1985 (date of the Ahlers' post-petition default on the Federal Land Bank
loans), and that Norwest was entitled to monthly adequate protection interest payments as
of February 27, 1985 (date of the evidentiary hearing). It found that the Ahlers did not
have sufficient funds to make these monthly payments .... Accordingly, it granted the
Federal Land Bank's and Norwest's motions for relief from the automatic stay.
Ahlers, 794 F.2d at 395 (emphasis added).
168. Id. at 395. The court acknowledged this problem and came to the same conclusion that the
American Mariner court did. Id. American Mariner stated: "to avoid overcompensating the se-
cured creditor, the timing of adequate protection should take account of the usual time and expense
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started before the debtor files for bankruptcy, the foreclosure filing day
will be the measuring point.16 9 Second, if the foreclosure proceeding has
not started before the bankruptcy filing, the day when the creditor moves
for adequate protection in bankruptcy court becomes the measuring
point.170
According to Minnesota law, which governed the Ahlers case, a
mortgagor is entitled to possession of all rents and profits from the real
estate for a twelve month redemption period following the foreclosure
sale of the property. 17 1 At the earliest, a foreclosure sale can take place
six weeks from the time a foreclosure proceeding begins. 172 Here, since
Norwest and FLB could not gain possession, sell the farm land, and rein-
vest the proceeds for a minimum of one year and six weeks after they
initiated the foreclosure, no adequate protection payments of interest
would be due until that time. 73
Minnesota law does not allow creditors to take possession of farm
machinery and equipment if the debtor is dependent on it to make a
living.174 Although it could have been liquidated, the Ahlers kept the
machinery.' 75 The court, however, required that adequate protection
payments be made on the Ahlers' farm machinery. According to Minne-
involved in repossession and sale of collateral." Crocker Nat'l Bank v. American Mariner Indus.,
Inc. (In re American Mariner Indus. Inc.), 734 F.2d 426,435, n.12 (9th Cir. 1984). The Ahlers court
reasoned that "a debtor can, by filing a bankruptcy petition, preclude or delay a secured creditor
from exercising this right and reinvesting the liquidation proceeds, the creditor has been deprived of
this benefit of its bargain." Ahlers, 794 F.2d at 395.
169. Ahlers, 794 F.2d at 395.
170. Id. The court based its decision on Grundy Nat'l Bank v. Tandem Mining Corp., 754 F.2d
1436, 1441 (4th Cir. 1985). Ahlers, 794 F.2d at 395-96 & n.6. The Grundy Court stated that a
hardship is imposed upon the debtor by making the petition for adequate protection the measure-
ment date. This allows the creditor the option to file for adequate protection payments months after
the bankruptcy petition has been filed, thus forcing the debtor to be unfairly liable for large makeup
payments. If the creditor wants protection, he should then be diligent in filing for it. Id.
171. Section 580.23(b)(2) states in pertinent part, "when lands have been sold in conformity with
the preceding sections of this chapter the mortgagor, the mortgagor's personal representatives or
assigns, within 12 months after such sale, may redeem such lands in accordance with the provisions
of payment of subdivision I .. " MINN. STAT. ANN. § 580.23 (West Supp. 1987).
172. Section 580.03 states, "Six weeks' published notice shall be given that such mortgage will be
foreclosed by sale of the mortgaged premises or some part thereof, and at least four weeks before the
appointed time of sale a copy of such notice shall be served .. " Id. § 580.03 (West 1947).
173. Ahlers, 794 F.2d at 396.
174. Id.
175. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 565.251 states:
The court may allow the respondent to retain or regain possession of the property
without filing a bond and may stay the action by the claimant for a reasonable period of
time not to exceed six months if the following conditions are met:
(1) the respondent is unable to make the required payments due to unforeseen eco-
nomic circumstances beyond the respondent's control;
(2) the respondent is dependent on the use of the property to earn a living.
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 565.251 (West Supp. 1987) (emphasis added).
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sota law, the Ahlers' grain and livestock could also be sold immediately
upon filing for bankruptcy; the court said adequate protection payments
would be required if the grain and livestock were not sold or if there were
a significant delay in doing SO. 17 6
Next, the court addressed the issue of when valuation of the collat-
eral for adequate protection should occur.177 The court overruled the
bankruptcy court's decision to value everything as of the date of the peti-
tion and instead decided that valuation should take place as of the date
when the collateral could be sold by the creditor. 178 Thus, the farm land
and machinery should be valued when state law would allow the sale,
while the grain and livestock would be valued upon the date of the peti-
tion for bankruptcy. 179
Finally, the court considered the timing of adequate protection pay-
ments in light of the cyclical nature of farming. The court determined
that because a farm does not realize any money until crops or livestock
are sold, monthly payments should not be required."' Under the Eighth
Circuit's analysis, the Ahlers would not have to pay adequate protection
payments until they sold their crops or livestock.
C. Reorganization Feasibility Analysis
The courts may also lift an automatic stay if a reorganization plan is
unfeasible."8 ' The district court, pursuant to the Eighth Circuit's order
to review the Ahlers' plan for feasibility, held that the plan was not feasi-
ble and, therefore, the stay should be lifted. 8 2 The Eighth Circuit judges
176. Ahlers, 794 F.2d at 396.
177. Id. at 396-97.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. This does not mean that adequate protection begins at this point. Instead, adequate protec-
tion accumulates from an appropriate date set by the court, and the payment of the accumulated
amount is made when the farmer receives payment for the sale of crops or livestock. Id. at 397, n.l 1.
181. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(2) (1982 & Supp. III 1985) which states:
(d) On request of a party in interest and after notice and a hearing, the court shall
grant relief from the stay provided under subsection (a) of this section, such as by terminat-
ing, annulling, modifying, or conditioning such stay-
(1) for cause, including the lack of adequate protection of an interest in prop-
erty of such party in interest; or
(2) with respect to a stay of an action against property, if-
(A) the debtor does not have an equity in such property; and
(B) such property is not necessary to an effective reorganization.
Id. (emphasis added).
182. The district court analyzed the plan on the basis of the factors outlined in United Proper-
ties, Inc. v. Emporium Dep't Stores, Inc., 379 F.2d 55 (8th Cir. 1967). See Ahlers, 794 F.2d at 398.
The court listed five main factors that should be evaluated: 1) ratio of current assets to current
liabilities; 2) solvency of the debtor; 3) evidence that debtor could operate at a profit; 4) cash flow;
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overruled the district court's findings and remanded the case back to the
bankruptcy court for review in accordance with their opinion. 183
The rationale behind finding a plan unfeasible lies in judicial inter-
pretation of the phrase "necessary to an effective reorganization' ' t 4 in
§ 362(d)(2)(B). Several courts' have held that a debtor must "not only
show that the property in question is essential to the reorganization plan,
but also that an effective reorganization is realistically possible."' 8 6 If
the reorganization is not realistically possible, the automatic stay should
not be enforced.'8 7
The Eighth Circuit Court overruled the district court, stating that
the court had misunderstood the law.' In determining if the automatic
stay could be lifted, the district court had used the value of the collateral
at the time that adequate protection values were determined rather than
at the time the plan was confirmed.'8 9 In a case such as Ahlers where the
value of the collateral changed, the feasibility of the plan may be vastly
different depending on the date of valuation. Once the values of the col-
lateral were reviewed and the secured debt was restructured to reflect
present values of the collateral under § 506(a),' 90 the Court believed the
and 5) capable management and satisfactory economic conditions. United Properties, 379 F.2d at 66-
71. The district court looked primarily at factors one and four to find the plan totally unfeasible
because current assets exceeded liabilities and the Ahlers could not expect a positive cash flow.
Ahlers, 794 F.2d at 398.
183. Ahlers, 794 F.2d at 399. The Eighth Circuit Court believed that the Ahlers might be able to
propose a feasible reorganization plan. "While the Ahlers current liabilities do exceed their current
assets, it appears probable that once their secured debt is restructured to reflect present values of
land and equipment... they can repay that debt over a reasonable period of time with interest and
make substantial payments to unsecured creditors." Id.
184. See supra note 13.
185. See, eg., Albany Partners, Ltd. v. W.P. Westbrook (In re Albany) 749 F.2d 670, 673 (11th
Cir. 1984); In re Discount Wallpaper Center, Inc., 19 Bankr. 221, 222 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1982).
186. Ahlers, 794 F.2d at 399. See also In re Dublin Properties, 12 Bankr. 77, 80 (Bankr. E.D.
Pa. 1981). "If no reorganization of the debtor is feasible, then no property of that debtor can be
necessary for that end." Id.
187. Ahlers, 794 F.2d at 398.
188. Id. (citing Martin, 761 F.2d at 475).
189. The court based its decision on when to evaluate collateral on the Senate Report on the
Bankruptcy Act. The Report stated in pertinent part:
While courts will have to determine value on a case-by-case basis, [11 U.S.C. § 506(a)]
makes it clear that valuation is to be determined in light of the purpose of the valuation and
the proposed disposition or use of the subject property. This determination shall be made
in conjunction with any hearing on such disposition or use of property or on a plan affect-
ing the creditor's interest. To illustrate, a valuation early in the case in a proceeding under
sections 361-363 would not be binding upon the debtor or creditor at the time of confirma-
tion of the plan. Throughout the bill, references to secured claims are only to the claim
determined to be secured under this subsection, and not to the full amount of the creditor's
claim.
S. REP. No. 989, supra note 30, at 68, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 5854.
190. Section 506(a) states:
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Ahlers would be able to repay the entire secured debt and a substantial
portion of the amount owed the unsecured creditors.19'
D. Absolute Priority Analysis
The absolute priority rule was the third main issue the court ad-
dressed.1 92 FLB and Norwest contended that they should get relief from
the stay because no feasible reorganization plan could be approved.' 93
Both creditors were substantially undersecured initially and the reorgani-
zation plan would threaten a still greater portion of their individual un-
secured claims. Further, Norwest and FLB argued that under the cram-
down provision of § 1129(b), the Ahlers would not be successful in hav-
ing the plan confirmed over their objections.194 Since the reorganization
plan called for the Ahlers to retain an interest in the farm without repay-
ing the unsecured creditors in full, the reorganization plan would not
satisfy the "fair and equitable" requirement under § 1129(b)(1).1 95
Since the two creditors could not agree to a single plan, the court
first considered whether the plan could be confirmed over their objec-
tions. 196 Section 1129(b) allows a bankruptcy court to confirm the plan
over the objections of creditors if two factors are met: 1) the plan does
not discriminate unfairly; and 2) the plan is fair and equitable with re-
gard to each objecting class of creditors.1 97
To determine if a reorganization plan will meet the test, the court
must consider the type of creditors in the dissenting class. 198 Here, the
reorganization plan had to provide for both the secured and unsecured
An allowed claim of a creditor secured by a lien on property in which the estate has an
interest, or that is subject to setoff under section 553 of this title, is a secured claim to the
extent of the value of such creditor's interest in the estate's interest in such property, or to
the extent of the amount subject to setoff, as the case may be, and is an unsecured claim to
the extent that the value of such creditor's interest or the amount so subject to setoff is less
than the amount of such allowed claim. Such value shall be determined in light of the
purpose of the valuation and of the proposed disposition or use of such property, and in
conjunction with any hearing on such disposition or use or on a plan affecting such credi-
tor's interest.
11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1982).
191. Ahlers, 794 F.2d at 399.
192. See id. at 399-403.
193. Norwest and FLB, as undersecured creditors, would not accept the reorganization plan
because the Ahlers could pay their claims in full. Therefore, they contended that confirmation could
not occur under 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(8)(A). Id. at 401.
194. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
195. See id. See also Ahlers, 794 F.2d at 399.
196. See Ahlers, 794 F.2d at 399.403.
197. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(1) (1982).
198. There are three types of creditors listed in § 1129: 1) secured claims; 2) unsecured claims;
and 3) class of interest. Each class has special rules that must be considered. See 11 U.S.C.
§ 1129(b) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
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creditors since both were represented. Regarding the unsecured creditor,
§ 1129(b)(2)(B) requires that one of two requirements be met for the plan
to be confirmed:199 1) either the class of unsecured creditors must retain
property equal to their allowed claim; or 2) there must be no junior
claims or interests participating in the plan or retaining an interest in the
debtor's property.2°° Norwest and FLB argued that under the proposed
reorganization plan, the Ahlers' would retain an equitable ownership in-
terest junior to the undersecured creditors without providing for full re-
covery of the unsecured senior creditors.201
The court disagreed with the position of Norwest and FLB, and
held that the "fair and equitable" test could be met even though the
Ahlers retained an equitable interest.2°2 The court based its decision on
the Supreme Court's modification of the absolute priority rule203 which
allowed a junior creditor to retain an ownership interest even though
senior creditors may receive less than their allowed claim.20 4 In reaching
that conclusion, the Ahlers court looked at previous cases which allowed
a debtor to make a fresh contribution of capital to the creditors in ex-
change for an equitable ownership interest based on the amount contrib-
uted.20 5 In all but one of the cases the court examined, fresh capital was
injected into the reorganization plan; in Los Angeles Lumber,20 6 however,
the Supreme Court stated that the contribution could be other than
money.
20 7
199. See Ahlers, 794 F.2d at 400-01.
200. Id. at 401. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) (Supp. III 1985). If no junior claims or inter-
est participate in the plan, then the plan can provide for any treatment of the class of unsecured
creditors. Ahlers, 794 F.2d at 401.
201. Norwest and FLB also contended that the "fair and equitable" standard could not be satis-
fied because "the Ahlers could not provide the unsecured creditors with property equal to the al-
lowed amount of their claims." Ahlers, 794 F.2d at 401.
202. Id.
203. The absolute priority rule was established in Northern Pac. R.R. v. Boyd, 228 U.S. 482
(1913). The rule provides that a dissenting class of creditors must be paid in full before any junior
class can receive or retain any property under the plan. Ahlers, 794 F.2d at 401.
204. Ahlers, 794 F.2d at 401-03.
205. See Kansas City Terminal Ry. Co. v. Central Union Trust Co., 271 U.S. 445 (1926). The
court recognized that in order for some reorganization plans to be feasible, the stockholders may
have to be allowed to inject new capital into the business. Id. at 455. See also Sophian v. Congress
Realty Co., 98 F.2d 499, 502 (8th Cir. 1938) (for the stockholders to retain an interest in the busi-
ness, it must appear that some compensatory additional capital has been made or they have an
equitable interest, after the rights of the creditors are fully protected, in the estate); Buffalo Say.
Bank v. Marston Enters. (In re Marston Enters.), 13 Bankr. 514, 517-18 (Bankr E.D. N.Y. 1981)
(new capital contributed to the business for reorganization will not violate the "fair and equitable"
standard).
206. 308 U.S. 106 (1939). This case involved a complicated group of holding companies and the
parent company in which liabilities exceeded assets by a substantial margin. Id. at 109-12.
207. The Court stated:
[Vol. 23:37
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Using the Los Angeles Lumber reasoning, the court found that the
Ahlers' efforts in managing and operating the farm were necessary for its
reorganization and that this "in-kind" contribution could be factored
into the farm's worth.2"8 Further, by allowing the farm to continue to
operate, its worth was greater than the liquidated value of its assets.20 9
The court reasoned that if this method of determining the net worth were
not allowed, then most farmers could not take advantage of the bank-
ruptcy act.210
The only remaining issue was whether the farmers' in-kind contribu-
tion was reasonably equivalent to the ownership interest the farmer
would retain under the reorganization plan. Although there is no mathe-
matical formula for making such a calculation, the farmer's labor, experi-
ence, and expertise could be assigned a monetary value. The court found
it difficult to value the total retained ownership interest, but eventually
used criteria from In re U.S.Truck Co. 211 and In re Landau Boat Co.21"
to determine the retained interest: 1) the future economic viability of the
debtor as reorganized; and 2) the possibilities that the debtor will be
profitable.2 13
It is, of course, clear that there are circumstances under which stockholders may partici-
pate in a plan of reorganization of an insolvent debtor. This Court, as we have seen, indi-
cated as much.... Mhis Court stress[es] the necessity, at times, of seeking new money
"essential to the success of the undertaking" from the old stockholders. Where that neces-
sity exists and the old stockholders make a fresh contribution and receive in return a par-
ticipation reasonably equivalent to their contribution, no objections can be made.
Id. at 121 (footnote omitted). The court went on to state:
In view of these considerations we believe that to accord "the creditor his full right of
priority against the corporate assets" where the debtor is insolvent, the stockholder's par-
ticipation must be based on a contribution in money or in money's worth, reasonably
equivalent in view of all the circumstances to the participation of the stockholder.
Id. at 122 (emphasis added).
208. Ahlers, 794 F.2d at 402.
209. The court reasoned:
[I]f the plan is rejected, the unsecured creditors will get nothing, whereas they will receive
annual payments if the plan is approved and is successful. The Ahlers' farm operation and
management skills are something of a value which would disappear if their farm was liqui-
dated. Because that value cannot be captured for creditors in the event of liquidation,
fairness is not violated if their Chapter 11 plan leaves that value in their hands. This view
also recognizes the broad rehabilitative purposes of the Bankruptcy Act-to give a debtor
with a reasonable chance of success an opportunity for a fresh start.
Id. at 402.
210. Id.
211. 47 Bankr. 932 (E.D. Mich. 1985). U.S. Truck Company is an intra-state trucking company
primarily engaged in shipping supplies and parts for the auto industry. The debtor filed for bank-
ruptcy because it could not get the wage concession it wanted from the union members that drove its
trucks. Id. at 934.
212. 13 Bankr. 788 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1981).
213. See U.S. Truck, 47 Bankr. at 941-42. Landau Boat states that:
The commercial value of property consists in the expectation of income from it.... Such
criterion is the appropriate one here, since we are dealing with the issue of solvency arising
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Applying these criteria to the Ahlers' situation, the court concluded
that no profit or benefit would be realized until the reorganization plan
was complete and the amounts due the secured creditors were paid in
full. Any excess profit above that anticipated in the reorganization plan
would be distributed to the unsecured creditors until the principal of
their debts were paid in full without interest.2 14 If any secured property
was sold during the time the plan was in effect, any excess above that
which was due to the secured creditor would be shared according to the
amount of unsecured creditor's contribution of capital and the owner's
interest at the time of the sale. 15 The court remanded the case back to
the bankruptcy court for compliance.
IV. ANALYSIS AND CONSEQUENCES
A. Adequate Protection
Congress allowed the courts to decide when adequate protection
payments should begin according to the equities of each individual
case.2 6 The Ahlers court balanced the equities and made the only logical
determination it could have made: it decided that adequate protection
would not be allowed on property until all the statutory foreclosure pro-
ceedings were complete.21 7
Filing a bankruptcy petition should neither lengthen nor shorten the
time in which a creditor will be allowed to have the collateral re-
turned.21 8 If FLB and Norwest had been allowed to receive adequate
protection payments earlier than the statutory redemption period, they
would have received more than what they bargained for in the original
transaction.21 9 The legislative history of § 361 specifically states that the
in connection with reorganization plans involving productive properties.... The criterion
of earning capacity is the essential one... if the allocation of securities among the various
claimants is to be fair and equitable ....
Landau, 13 Bankr. at 792-93 (quoting Consolidated Rock Products v. DuBois, 312 U.S. 510, 526
(1941)). See generally In re The Alison Corp., 9 Bankr. 827 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1981).
214. Ahlers, 794 F.2d at 403. If the excess was given to the equitable interest it would receive
more than the value of its contribution. Id.
215. Id.
216. See supra note 67.
217. See Ahlers, 794 F.2d at 395-96. See also In re Bear Creek Ministorage, Inc., 49 Bankr. 454,
458-59 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1985). See generally Doty v. Pulliam (In re Pulliam), 54 Bankr. 624, 625-
26 (W.D. Mo. 1985).
218. See generally General Elec. Mfg. Corp. v. South Village, Inc. (In re South Village, Inc.), 25
Bankr. 987, 996 n.14 (Bankr. D. Utah 1982). "The date of the petition, however, may be irrelevant
to opportunity cost which would accrue only from the date upon which the creditor-absent the
stay--could first liquidate the collateral whenever that might be." Id.
219. The American Mariner court noted that "to avoid overcompensating the secured creditor,
the timing of adequate protection should take account of the usual time and expense involved in
[Vol. 23:37
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party seeking adequate protection be allowed the benefit of the bar-
gain;220 it does not suggest that the creditor should get more than ini-
tially bargained for.
The court must balance the interests involved to reach an equitable
decision; it would not be fair for the debtor to pay money that would not
be due absent bankruptcy. By making payments due earlier than antici-
pated, the debtor is denied a breathing spell from the creditors and thus,
the policy objectives supporting the automatic stay are not achieved.2z
Early payments deplete any cash resources a debtor may have and could
drastically reduce the chances for an effective reorganization. 22 If a
creditor were allowed to receive protection payments, then that possibil-
ity would serve as an incentive to force the debtor into bankruptcy since
the creditor would be entitled to both the collateral and the payments
already made by the debtor. Neither interest payments for the lost op-
portunity to reinvest the money nor the decline in the value of the collat-
eral due to depreciation or consumption should be allowed until
foreclosure proceedings are complete and the redemption period has
ended. 2z Interest payments should be made if the creditor's collateral
was not returned to the creditor after the foreclosure redemption period
had passed.2 24 The court seemed hesitant to follow the opportunity cost
theory but did so because of the decision in In re Briggsz25 which allowed
the bankruptcy court discretion as to what theory to use.
While the arguments for both the opportunity cost and maintenance
of value theories are compelling, the latter seems most convincing. First,
the argument that the creditor should receive the value of the "benefit of
repossession and sale of collateral." Crocker Nat'l Bank v. American Mariner Indus., Inc. (In re
American Mariner Indus., Inc.), 734 F.2d 426, 435, n.12 (9th Cir. 1984). Using this language to
interpret the Ahlers case, the court followed the analysis by looking at the statute which governs
foreclosure proceedings. Ahlers, 794 F.2d at 396.
220. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
221. Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244-45 (1934) (that is to afford the debtor a "new
opportunity in life and a clear field for future effort, unhampered by the pressure and discourage-
ment of pre-existing debt").
222. See Gordanier, The Indubitable Equivalent of Reclamation: Adequate Protection for Se-
cured Creditors under the Bankruptcy Code, 54 AM. BANKR. L.J. 299, 302-03 (1980)
A business in financial difficulties so grave that its managers are considering bankruptcy
probably will have either sold outright or pledged as collateral all assets of any value....
It is difficult to perceive how a secured creditor is justly to be compensated for the impair-
ment of collateral which almost inevitably results from the debtor's use of that collateral
during reorganization.
Id.
223. See supra notes 167-170 and accompanying text.
224. Ahlers, 794 F.2d at 395.
225. 780 F.2d 1339 (8th Cir. 1985).
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the bargain" is tenuous at best 226 because each time a loan is made, the
creditor realizes that there is a chance that the debtor might become un-
able to pay or even go into bankruptcy. To avoid adverse consequences,
the rate of interest charged by the creditor contains a "risk percentage,"
which is a small percentage for loans that are uncollectible.227 Further, if
a creditor anticipates a decrease in the value of the collateral, additional
collateral may be initially required.228 Because the creditor has an op-
portunity to allocate the risk when negotiating the loan, and instead
chooses to bear the losses resulting from a debtor's insolvency, the court
should not be forced to provide relief. Finally, by making the debtor pay
interest, the court violated the intent of Congress that the automatic stay
give the debtor a breathing spell. 229
The "indubitable equivalent" argument set forth in American Mari-
ner has not been widely accepted. 230  Both judges and commentators
have found it unlikely that Congress meant the phrase to require com-
pensation to be made for present value since that language was not
used.23'
In applying the argument from American Mariner that the meaning
of "indubitable equivalent" in § 1129 must carry over to § 361, the court
failed to look at the context in which the phrase was placed in the stat-
ute.2 32 As noted above, the term comes from Judge Hand's opinion in In
re Murel Holding Co., a case dealing with cram-down provisions and not
with adequate protection. 233 The § 1129 cram-down provisions require
the protection of present value. In contrast, § 361 does not require the
use of indubitable equivalent, and it is instead merely the method by
which protection may be provided.234
226. See Comment, supra note 71, at 359; see also Note, Adequate Protection Becomes a Credi-
tor's Tool: In re American Mariner Industries, Inc., 21 WILLIAMETrE L. REv. 149, 165 (1985).
227. See Comment, supra note 71, at 359.
228. Id.
229. See supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text.
230. See, eg., General Elec. Mfg. Corp. v. South Village, Inc. (In re South Village, Inc.), 25
Bankr. 987, 991 n.4 (Bankr. D. Utah 1982).
231. See Comment, supra note 71, at 361.
232. See Barclays Bank v. Saypol (In re Saypol), 31 Bankr. 796, 802 (Bankr. S.D. N.Y. 1983)
("It thus appears that the term 'indubitable equivalent' was added merely to afford the court with
flexibility to prevent the secured creditor from being unduly harmed by erosion of the value of the
collateral during the stay."). The court also found that it makes little, if any, sense to read anything
more into "indubitable equivalent" in the adequate protection context of § 362(d). Such a reading
would expand the intent manifested in the legislative history far beyond its intended meaning and be
inconsistent with the scheme for allowance of secured claims. Id.
233. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Shriver (In re Shriver), 33 Bankr. 176, 183 (Bankr. N.D.
Ohio 1983).
234. If the stay is responsible for a decline in value, Section 361 states three illustrative
methods for providing adequate protection. Some courts, however, have not looked be-
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American Mariner refers to the Congressional use of the Murel case
as its source for the definition of indubitable equivalent in § 361(3)
though it is used in § 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii). 235 Once again, the court used a
case out of context. Murel dealt specifically with a cram-down situation
for which Congress intended § 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii) definitions to be ap-
plied.236 Further, the use of indubitable equivalence and protection of
present value is mandatory in § 1129, while in § 361(3) it is merely a
permissive method.237 Finally, the legislative history shows that Con-
gress knew about the present value situation but chose not to change the
language of the statute.238
B. Reorganization Plan
The court's decision to allow experience, knowledge, and labor to be
considered part of a reorganization plan was a novel approach. From
this commentator's research, no previous court has allowed this method,
and predictably, it has provoked both praise and criticism.
Three arguments support the Eighth Circuit's decision to modify
the strict rule or absolute priority rule: 1) the case law modifying the
absolute priority rule; 2) the legislative history of the reorganization of
§ 1129 of the Bankruptcy Act of 1978; and 3) the § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) defi-
nition of what is considered property.
The first argument is typified by Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Prod-
yond its trilogy of alternatives. Others have insisted on a showing of indubitable equiva-
lence. These approaches miss the mark: they violate the nonprescriptive character of
Section 361, and may simply exchange one imponderable for another. Indubitable equiva-
lence is not a method; nor does it have substantive content. Indeed, something "indubita-
ble" is more than "adequate"; "equivalent" is more than "protection"; hence, the
illustration may eclipse the concept. At best, it is a semantic substitute for adequate pro-
tection and one with dubious, not indubitable application to the question of relief from the
stay.
Bankers Life Ins. Co. v. Alyucan Interstate Corp. (In re Alyucan Interstate Corp.), 12 Bankr. 803,
809 (Bankr. D. Utah 1981).
235. See supra notes 86-91 and accompanying text.
236. H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 27, at 414-15, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws at
6370-71; S. REP. No. 989, supra note 30, at 127, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws at 5913.
237. Section 361 states in part: "When adequate protection is required under section 362, 363 or
364 of this title of an interest of an entity in property, such adequate protection may be provided
by .. " 11 U.S.C. § 361 (Supp. III 1985) (emphasis added). Section 1129 states: "For the purpose
of this subsection, the condition that a plan be fair and equitable with respect to a class includes the
following requirements .. " 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2) (Supp. III 1985) (emphasis added).
238. See Bankruptcy Act Revision: Hearings on H.R.31 and H.R.32 Before the Subcomm. on
Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1943,
2116-17 (1976); Bankruptcy Reform Act of.1978: Hearings on S.2266 and H.R.8200 Before the Sub-
comm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong.,
1st Sess. 490, 599 (1977).
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ucts Co. ,239 a landmark case previously discussed and relied upon by the
Ahlers court. In Ahlers, the court relied upon the language of Los Ange-
les Lumber which stated that the contribution could be in "money's
worth." In Los Angeles Lumber, the shareholders argued that they
should be allowed to participate and obtain new stock because the share-
holders' financial standing and influence in the community would be ben-
eficial to the bondholders and that they could thereby provide continuity
of management.' Because both of these items were difficult to value,
the court did not allow the shareholders to retain an equitable interest.
From the court's discussion of this subject, it appears that if a value
could have been attached to these two intangibles, the court might have
allowed the new shareholders an equity position.2 41 The valuing of a
farmer's labor, knowledge, and experience would be less difficult to mea-
sure in the Ahlers case, however, because professional farm managers
could provide an accurate estimate as to the worth of the Ahlers' serv-
ices. Given the ease with which a value could be determined, it seems
likely that a court would allow the contributor of non-capital assets to
retain an equitable interest.
The second argument, the legislative history of the Bankruptcy
Code, gives the strongest indication that the Ahlers decision was correct.
The language of the 1978 Code itself does not offer any assistance in
defining either the fair and equitable requirement for unsecured creditors
or a modified version of the traditional absolute priority rule.242 Con-
gressional records are not helpful in making this determination either; no
assistance can be found regarding the statute itself, or anything else per-
taining to the absolute priority rule. Since there is nothing in the latest
legislative materials or statute, then prior enactments of the Bankruptcy
Code should be analyzed to determine what the statute means.243
239. See supra notes 118-20 and accompanying text.
240. Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Prod. Co., 308 U.S. 106, 122, reh'g denied, 308 U.S. 637
(1939).
241. Id. at 122-23.
242. See supra note 14.
243. The Amicus Brief at 16-17, In re Ahlers, 794 F.2d 388 (8th Cir. 1986), expresses the
proposition:
For, while the best evidence of what was intended by a state will generally consist of the
words selected by the legislature, courts may look to legislative history for further evidence
"in order to determine whether giving the words their natural significance leads to an
unreasonable result plainly at variance with the policy of the legislation as a whole."
United States v. American Trucking Association, 60 S.Ct. 1059, 1064 (1940). See also,
Ozawa v. United States, 43 S.Ct. 65 (1922); Chatwin v. United States, 66 S.Ct. 233 (1946). In
situations where the legislative intention apparently expressed in a statute is doubtful, the
court may look to preceding statutory enactments dealing with the amount needed to fund
the Chapter 11 plan was sufficient to allow the shareholders to participate in the reorgani.
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The last major change in bankruptcy law occured in 1952 when
Congress eliminated the "fair and equitable" requirement under Chapter
11 because it did not allow closely-held businesses or individual creditors
to utilize that Chapter. The section was thus amended to read:
Confirmation of an arrangement shall not be refused solely because the
interest of a debtor, or if the debtor is a corporation, the interests of its
stockholders or members will be preserved under the arrangement.244
The House record stated that if this was not changed, many small corpo-
rations and individuals would not be able to utilize the relief provided by
these chapters. Both the Senate and the House flatly rejected the strict
application of the absolute priority rule found in the Boyd and Los Ange-
les Lumber cases.245 Congress would only allow the absolute priority
rule to be used under Chapter 10 when dealing with certain types of
corporate reorganizations where it considered the absolute priority rule
to be appropriate.
The law remained unchanged until the 1978 revision in which Con-
gress recognized that many large corporations escaped the absolute pri-
ority rule by filing for bankruptcy under Chapter 11. The 1978 Code
consolidated chapters 10, 11, and 12 to stop corporations from utilizing
bankruptcy to a creditor's disadvantage.246 Some general discussion sur-
rounds the confirmation of a plan over the objection of creditors, but the
Code does not specifically address how the absolute priority rule would
be applied to debtors who previously qualified under the old chapters 11
and 12. Since there was no legislative discussion about the absolute pri-
ority rule by the 1978 Congress, it appears reasonable to consider the
1952 changes and conclude that the absolute priority rule is not to be
strictly applied to individual debtors.247 As stated before, Congress' rea-
son for combining all three sections was to eliminate corporate loopholes,
and not to shut off bankruptcy help for individual debtors such as farm-
ers. If the absolute priority rule is strictly applied, little relief is available
to individual debtors such as the Ahlers, and the public policy goals be-
hind Chapter 11 are frustrated. Individual debtors would be unable to
start over if the absolute priority rule is strictly applied.
zated corporation. See also In re Landau Boat Company, 13 B.R. (sic) 788 (Bankr. W.D.
Mo. 1981) and Matter of U.S. Truck Company, Inc, 47 B.R. (sic) 932 (E.D. Mich. 1985).
Id.
244. 11 U.S.C. § 366 (1952).
245. See In re Star City Rebuilders, Inc., 62 Bankr. 983, 988 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1986).
246. See H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 27, at 250-54, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
at 6209-13.
247. See Amicus Brief at 23-24, In re Ahlers, 794 F.2d 388 (8th Cir. 1986).
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The final argument comes from In re Star City Rebuilders, Inc. ,24 s
where defining what is considered "property" under the cram-down pro-
vision becomes critical. In that case, a reorganization plan, allowing un-
secured creditors to receive no less than 5% of their claims, was
confirmed over their objections. The owners of the common stock of the
bankrupt company would continue to own the stock and keep whatever
future rights would accrue upon the plan's completion, but they would
not receive any dividends or other monetary compensation from the
ownership of the stock while the plan was in effect.249 The court allowed
the previous owners to retain possession of the stock because they felt it
was not tangible property as defined in § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii), and thus its
ownership did not affect the reorganization plan.250
In categorizing stock as intangible property, the court appears to
have used the definition of property as a means to argue policy and jus-
tify the stock ownership. The policy arguments raised by the court are
supported by the legislative history discussed above. By allowing the
owners of small corporations, like Star City Rebuilders, to retain owner-
ship of stock and have some vested interest in running the business, the
court provided an automatic incentive. Without it, owners would not
have an interest in rehabilitating the business and generating income to
repay both the secured and unsecured creditors; instead they would liqui-
date and the unsecured creditors would receive less than if the owners
attempted to revive the business.251 While it may be more feasible to
liquidate the business in some situations, the justification for doing so
should not be simply the strict construction of § 1129. The debtor would
have few remaining options thus violating Congress' intent to allow the
possibility of reorganizing the business.
The court founded its decision on equitable policy considerations
when it allowed the Ahlers to retain their farm after the creditor's inter-
ests were paid to a certain extent. If the court had not allowed the
Ahlers to keep their property, then the Bankruptcy Code would have
foreclosed any avenues of rehabilitation for the farmer debtor.
Judge Gibson's dissent highlights many of the arguments against the
Ahlers court's interpretation of the cram-down provision."' As dis-
cussed, § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) does not allow a debtor to participate in a
248. 62 Bankr. 983 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1986).
249. Id. at 984.
250. Id. at 988-89.
251. Id. at 984.
252. Ahlers, 794 F.2d at 404, 406-08.
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plan unless the unsecured claims are paid in full, thus protecting un-
secured creditors from suffering losses greater than those which may
have been predicted. Judge Gibson viewed Los Angeles Lumber as a nar-
row window in which the absolute priority rule can be circumvented by
allowing for a contribution of labor, experience, and knowledge25" in ex-
change for capital. But the only time this window should be opened is
when money is contributed to the business for an ownership interest.254
In other cases in which the reorganization plan has allowed a debtor
an equity stake in the business, the debtor has given cash or capital of a
tangible value. No other case has yet allowed labor to be used as a tangi-
ble asset with an accurate value.25 ' Because capital, not labor, is the
basis for exchange in our economy, the use of labor as the debtor's con-
tribution does not afford the creditor with the measure of protection pro-
vided by capital contributions. If the reorganization plan becomes
unfeasible in the future, the capital contribution could be liquidated and
the creditor could receive something in return; labor may not be liqui-
dated to protect the creditor.
Further, capital must be contributed in total before the reorganiza-
tion plan is approved, while if labor is allowed, the creditors cannot be
certain that the farmer will work for the entire length of the plan. In
confirming the plan, the court in effect makes the farmer a servant to the
farm. A future court may face the question of whether it may order the
specific performance of labor obligations in the event that the farmer is
no longer able to contribute labor and expertise to the farm.256
Finally, the creditor does not receive the full benefit of the bargain.
Cash was loaned with the expectation of some return, even within bank-
ruptcy. No creditor issuing a loan could reasonably foresee that a debtor
would be allowed to retain an interest in the business without a capital
contribution or that an unsecured creditor would not be paid the full
amount that is due. By allowing the bankrupt debtor an equity interest
in the business, the court irresponsibly expands the capital contribution
exception to the absolute priority rule. The result is a clear violation of
the "fair and equitable" requirement25 7 and invites unpredictability into
253. Id. at 406-07.
254. See id. at 407.
255. The court in Los Angeles Lumber stated: "[Such items] have no place in the asset column
of the balance sheet of the new company. They reflect merely vague hopes or possibilities. As such,
they cannot be the basis for issuance of stock to otherwise valueless interests." Case v. Los Angeles
Lumber Prod. Co., 308 U.S. 106, 122-23, reh'g denied, 308 U.S. 637 (1939) (footnote omitted).
256. Ahlers, 794 F.2d at 407 (citing Karrick v. Hannaman, 168 U.S. p28, 335-36 (1897)).
257. Id.
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the debtor-creditor allocation of risk.
V. CONCLUSION
Allowing lost opportunity cost interest payments on a case-by-case
basis is not consistent with the legislative history and case law surround-
ing the Bankruptcy Code. The arguments supporting the strict applica-
tion of the absolute priority rule in § 1129 seem consistent with the intent
of the reorganization provisions. Previous courts allowing a junior inter-
est to have an equity claim have allowed the debtor to only contribute
cash. By allowing labor instead of capital, the Ahlers court allows too
many variables to remain open, thus making it impossible to determine
the feasibility of a proposed bankruptcy reorganization plan. Although
the 1952 change in the cram-down provisions evidences some intent to
soften the impact of the rules, Congress surely realized the problems that
would occur with regard to unsecured creditors under § 1129(b)(2)(B) if
it allowed a flexible application of the "fair and equitable" requirement.
Although Congress could have changed the statute to allow for individ-
ual debtors, it instead enacted Chapter 13, for which most farmers do not
qualify, to assist individual debtors.
With the recent adoption of Chapter 12 of the Bankruptcy Code, it
appears that Congress has now acknowledged that the current Code can-
not adequately deal with the problems of farmers. Cases like Ahlers do
not clarify the law, they only perpetuate its misapplication. Ultimately,
only legislative action like the enactment of Chapter 12 can adequately
remedy the situation. In the interim, the courts should not be allowed to
step out of their bounds and interpret laws on such weak and varied
precedent.
[Vol. 23:37
40
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 23 [1987], Iss. 1, Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol23/iss1/2
